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ABSTRACT
The denouement of the Trump presidency was a white supremacist
coup attempt against a backdrop of public reawakening to the persistence
of institutionalized racism. Though the United States has entered a new
administration with a leader that expresses his commitment to ending
institutionalized racism, the United States continues to imprison Central
American and Mexican immigrants at the southern border. If the majority
of the people in immigration jails at the border are Latinx, does
immigration law disparately impact them, and do they have a right to equal
protection? If they do, would equal protection protect them?
This Article explores whether the immigration statute that permits
discretionary imprisonment of migrants seeking protection at the United
States–Mexico border violates the Equal Protection Clause. In order to
answer that question, the Article outlines equal protection intent
jurisprudence, beginning with the intent doctrine—the framework used to
determine if a facially race-neutral law is discriminatory. In addition, it
considers the shortcomings of the intent doctrine and parses plenary
power—the legal doctrine that the Court invokes to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction or limiting review of immigration laws.
After examining the intent doctrine generally and specifically within
immigration law, this Article undertakes a limited analysis of a
hypothetical equal protection challenge to a facially neutral immigration
statute, INA § 235(b)(1)(A), with potentially disparate impact on Latinx
immigrants.1 As a result of grappling with the shortcomings of the intent
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1. The analysis is limited because it would be beyond the scope of this Article for it to exhaust
all arguments from the standpoint of each element, but more to the point, it focuses on specific
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doctrine and the barrier of plenary power, this Article considers ways in
which the Supreme Court of the United States could interpret the intent
doctrine in a manner that might enhance equal protection efficacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right to equal protection2 is the only
constitutionally enshrined tool to address express or facially neutral—or
elements to demonstrate a particular problem within equal protection intent doctrine in immigration
law.
2. The anti-discrimination principle that characterizes equal protection at the federal level comes
from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides
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implicit—discrimination by government actors.3 However, courts and
constitutional law scholars notoriously in disagree about both the framers’
intent and what the doctrine can, and should, mean today.4 This Article
outlines ways in which equal protection could be more effective in the face
of immigration laws with disparate impact, given the heightened
awareness of systemic racial injustice and inequity.
What if the equal protection doctrine actually furthered equality? 5
What if the equal protection doctrine prohibited the United States from
making and enforcing immigration laws that racialized and oppressed
noncitizens, particularly since they are “people” and therefore entitled to
Fifth Amendment protections?6 What if the equal protection doctrine
could address the most visible—and simultaneously invisible—symbol of
the racism of U.S. immigration laws: the immigration prison? This Article
begins to answer these questions.
Currently, the equal protection doctrine is not designed to remedy
racial harm from the standpoint of race as a social construct or as

that “no person” (hence not limited to citizens) shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the Fifth Amendment does not expressly
contain an equal protection clause like the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states, it is
understood to forbid discrimination that is “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). As noted by John Bingham, drafter of the Fifth Amendment, “It
must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and the equal protection of each, are principles of
our Constitution . . . .” CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (1857).
3. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner
(Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 59 (1995) (explaining that “the Equal Protection
Clause was meant to protect principally against racially discriminatory administration that victimized
nonwhites”). Most narrowly defined, it “is a limitation on a state’s administration of the laws.” Id. at
58.
4. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (proclaiming an
erroneous “misdirected application of the theory of original intent”); see also Samuel Marcosson,
Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas at the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. 429,
463 n.144 (1998) (“The constitutional attack on affirmative action programs by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, without any investigation of history on their part, is one of the most disturbing features of
their purported originalism.”) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 92 n.465 (1996)); Perry, supra note 3, at 55 (explaining why Richard Posner is
wrong that “on a consistent application of originalism,” i.e., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), “was decided incorrectly”).
5. The public is more skeptical about this possibility, especially after the Supreme Court’s
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987), which held that the state of Georgia’s death
penalty was not applied in a racially discriminatory manner, despite significant racial disparities. See
Surell Brady, A Failure of Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Claims in Criminal Cases, 52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 735, 740 (2002) (acknowledging the “growing public perception that the Supreme
Court has closed off the debate insofar as equal protection of the laws is concerned”).
6. See Sarah L. Hamilton-Jiang, Children of a Lesser God: Reconceptualizing Race in
Immigration Law, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 38, 70 (2019) (highlighting how Latinx immigrants have
long been subjected to mythical narratives of criminality).
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institutionalized racism.7 “Race” is a social construct defined by
institutions, cultural practices, and law.8 “Racialization” is the
construction of a racial identity through characterizing comparative merits
based on superficial attributes, like physical appearance.9 Because
immigration law, criminal law, and the point at which they converge have
contributed to the construction of race, these areas of law are
simultaneously two of the biggest threats to equality, yet the most invisible
and hardest to overcome.10 Why does immigration law exert such a
stronghold on the making of race yet so fiercely resist curtailment? It may
be because the tools available were not really designed to dismantle it. 11
Immigration equal protection challenges face an impenetrable wall
comprised of both the intent doctrine and plenary power. When a law is
facially neutral but allegedly has a disparate impact on a disfavored
minority group, pursuant to the current doctrine, the Court attempts to
discern whether the government actor harbored discriminatory intent when
creating the challenged law or state action.12 Similarly, the Court invokes

7. See Maureen Johnson, Separate but (Un)equal: Why Institutionalized Anti-Racism is the
Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 335 (2018) (arguing
that “the best way to combat institutionalized racism is institutionalized anti-racism” (emphasis
added)).
8. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 45 (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., 10th ed. 2006) (“Race is often seen in fixed terms, either as a
biological given or a static social category. However, as the debates about race at the turn of the century
demonstrate, racial categorization is a fluid process that turns not only on prejudice, but also on factors
ranging from dubious science to national honor.”).
9. Hamilton-Jiang, supra note 6, at 62–63 (explaining that the term originated in sociology and
“refers to the methods and process by which race imposes differential and prejudicial meaning upon
different groups, constructing a racial identity”) (citing Racialize, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016)); see also MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S (2d ed. 1994); Carrie L.
Rosenbaum, The Natural Persistence of Racial Disparities in Crime-Based Removals, 13 U. SAINT
THOMAS L.J. 532, 536 (2017) (arguing that “[c]riminality has long been used as a determiner of
desirability for noncitizens” and “has somewhat successfully masked racialization”).
10. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 483 (2004)
(“[C]an a single standard of review effectively screen all types of classifications without negating
either the deference to government decision making traditionally accorded under rational basis review
or the bias-sensitive review effectuated by strict and intermediate scrutiny?”); Bill Ong
Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 309 (2009)
(“[T]he structure of immigration laws has institutionalized a set of values that dehumanize, demonize,
and criminalize immigrants of color.”).
11. It is also overlooked by scholars exploring the shortcomings of Equal Protection. See, e.g.,
Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 387 (2017)
(“This Article asks what can be done” where all but express discrimination is vulnerable to equal
protection challenges in the era of intent and “argues that ‘postracial remedies’ are a necessary
component of an effective strategy to combat racial disparities in areas such as wealth, incarceration,
education, and housing.”).
12. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976).
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the plenary power doctrine, in this context, when it either abstains from
exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional claim or gives great deference
to legislative or executive authority over immigration law.13 The
combination of these two doctrines in particular results in a dilution of
constitutional protections for noncitizens.14
The Court has applied equal protection guarantees within civil
alienage laws—those that pertain to noncitizens within the United States.
Yet within immigration law, which dictates who can become and remain
a member of the legal and political community within the United States,
equal protection is less protective. Simultaneously, immigration regulation
has contributed to the making of race.15 The social construction of race in
immigration law has occurred through national origin quotas; racial
restrictions on naturalization;16 exploitive policies influenced by labor
13. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 210 (2003) (“In the United
States, plenary power to regulate immigration generally has meant the fervent rejection of any limits
on the sovereign’s power to impose immigration restrictions.”); see also David A. Martin, Why
Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015) (examining the plenary
power doctrine’s persistence).
14. See, e.g., Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners . . . is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance
into the country.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 53–74 (1998) (advocating abolishing the
plenary doctrine); Kevin R. Johnson, Federalism and the Disappearing Equal Protection Rights of
Immigrants, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 269, 270 (2016) (criticizing “the continuing vitality of
the plenary power doctrine” and how it “shields from judicial review invidious classifications under
the U.S. immigration laws”).
15. See, e.g., NATALIA MOLINA, HOW RACE IS MADE IN AMERICA: IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
AND THE HISTORICAL POWER OF RACIAL SCRIPTS 11 (Earl Lewis, George Lipsitz, George Sánchez,
Dana Takagi, Laura Briggs & Nikhil Pal Singh eds., 2014); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 27 (2014); see also Gabriel J. Chin,
Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(2002) (“[T]he intellectual foundations of the immigration laws were eugenics and scientific racism.”);
Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 943 n.36 (2008) (explaining that racism
functions more as a verb than a noun because as speech “it refers to a socially constructed idea or
meaning derived from a history of oppression” and refers to “conduct in that it is perpetuated and
reinforced through an ongoing process of contemporaneous speech and acts”) (citing Kendall Thomas,
Nash Professor of L. & Co-Director of the Ctr. for the Study of L. & Culture at Columbia L. Sch.,
Comments at Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of Legal Thought, Duke Law
School (Jan. 26, 1990)); David B. Oppenheimer, Swati Prakash & Rachel Burns, Playing the Trump
Card: The Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (2016)
(“[r]ecognizing the complexity of the social construction of ‘otherness’” to analyze “assimilation or
integration by immigrant and migrant groups into American society”); Carrie L. Rosenbaum,
Crimmigration—Structural Tools of Settler Colonialism, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 27 (2018)
(“[F]ederal immigration law and policy, criminal and immigration racial profiling jurisprudence, and
criminalization of migration have converged to signify new and additional ways to contain and
control.”).
16. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 27–28; see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111
(1998) (exploring the United States’ history of racial discrimination in immigration policy).
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needs and capitalism,17 like the Bracero Program;18 and mass-deportation
programs targeting or disproportionately burdening particular ethnic
groups or persons of particular national origins, like the repatriation of
Mexican nationals in the 1930s19 or Operation Wetback in 1954.20 More
recently, other race-neutral immigration policies hide discrimination in
colorblind21 or race-neutral terms, yet reflect a longstanding pattern of
discrimination that racialized immigrants receive at the hands of the
authorities. Policies that ban immigration from Muslim-majority
countries,22 utilize migrant detention centers on the border to imprison
Latinx migrants,23 terminate programs like Temporary Protected Status
17. See Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Regime:
Part I: A New Vision for Workplace Regulation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479, 553 (2009)
(observing, in the context of worker protections for immigrant workers, that the “exploitative Bracero
Program, under which approximately one million Mexican workers were temporarily admitted into
the United States to serve the needs of the agricultural sector, is indicative of the way in which law
has tacitly (yet indelibly) framed immigrant labor, particularly Latino immigrant labor, as an
expendable” (parenthetical in original)).
18. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (Routledge 1992) (criticizing the guest worker Bracero Program);
ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY (1964) (critically
recounting the Mexican Bracero story).
19. See generally FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF
BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (rev. ed. 2006) (discussing the history of
“repatriation” during the Great Depression).
20. See JUAN RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, 139 (1980); see also Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican
Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 632–33 (1981).
World War II created a labor shortage that resulted in a shift in American attitudes toward immigration
from Mexico. Thus, at least for a short while, the United States welcomed Mexican nationals with
open arms. In fact, a temporary worker program called the Bracero Program was implemented to
provide thousands of low-wage workers in the Southwest during this era. See Bill Ong Hing, No Place
for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 601 (2000).
21. John Tehranian, Playing Cowboys and Iranians: Selective Colorblindness and the Legal
Construction of White Geographies, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 72 (2015) (“[T]he very same courts that
tell us that we have a colorblind Constitution have also held that one’s Latino appearance is a relevant
factor in determining reasonable suspicion for an immigration sweep, one’s Middle-Eastern heritage
is a perfectly suitable consideration when ascertaining whether transportation of a passenger is
‘inimical to safety,’ and one’s African-American descent can serve as an acceptable indicia of
criminality without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.”).
22. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780,
3 C.F.R. § 301 (2018); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 3 C.F.R. § 272 (2018).
23. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97
B.U. L. REV. 245, 245–46 (2017) (arguing for abolition of immigration prisons, the majority of which
are filled with Latinos); Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96
DENV. L. REV. 585 (2019) (arguing for reparations in the form of humanitarian asylum, an expansion
of TPS, and litigation in response to historic oppression and mistreatment of Central American asylum
seekers including in response to family separation policies and imprisonment in border jails); Carrie
Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary Power,
28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 118 (2018) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process
Deficit].
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(TPS),24 and rescind Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) are
examples of recent immigration policies that contribute to racialization.25
Through the use of national origin as a race-neutral and colorblind
proxy, the Trump Administration’s “[c]olorblind [r]epatriation of Latinx
[n]oncitizens,” including border jails,26 will impact Latinx families in the
United States long after Trump’s presidency.27 Just as the “criminal
process exacerbates the stereotype of black criminality that has suppressed
African American civic authority for over a century,”28 the caging of
migrants seeking protection exacerbates the racialized stereotype of Latinx
illegality.29 The system perpetuates the civic disenfranchisement that
marks the alien citizen experience well after migrants gain formal
membership.30
24. See Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed.
Reg. 26,074 (June 5, 2018); Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status,
83 Fed. Reg. 2,648 (Jan. 18, 2018); Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary
Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,636 (Dec. 15, 2017). The administration also ended TPS for citizens
of Sudan but extended it to natives of South Sudan. See Termination of the Designation of Sudan for
Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed Reg. 47,228 (Oct. 11, 2017); Extension of South Sudan for
Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,205 (Sept. 21, 2017).
25. See Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1497 (2019)
(ominously warning that “the new Latinx” is different from the 1930s and 1954 era ones in that the
new version “institutionalize[s] the racial impacts of immigration enforcement through race-neutral
means” and “will affect many thousands more noncitizens than the repatriation and Operation
Wetback”).
26. See id.
27. SARAH PIERCE, JESSICA BOLTER & ANDREW SELEE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY UNDER TRUMP: DEEP CHANGES AND LASTING IMPACTS 15 (2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCMTrumpSpring2018-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SG9-CQXN] (“No administration in modern U.S. history has placed such a high
priority on immigration policy or had an almost exclusive focus on restricting immigration flows, legal
and unauthorized alike. This, in and of itself, marks a major departure in how immigration is discussed
and managed . . . [, and] over time . . . could reshape U.S. immigration policy significantly[.]”).
28. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 167 (2018).
29. See Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie
Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1721 n.76 (2018) (“Leo Chavez has argued that this immigrant ‘threat narrative’ was constructed
and replenished over the course of a century.”) (citing Leo R. Chavez, “Illegality” Across
Generations: Public Discourse and the Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING
IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY”: CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84, 86 (Cecilia Menjívar &
Daniel Kanstroom eds., 2014)); see also id. (explaining that the threat narrative “posits that Latinos,
led by Mexicans and Mexican Americans, are unwilling to integrate socially, unwilling to learn
English and U.S. culture, and preparing for a take over [of] the Southwest of the United States”);
Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 41 (“The narratives of crimmigration and chain migration demonstrate
a simple truth—there is no good immigrant, because there is always a narrative that deems a racialized
immigrant of color as unassimilable, which necessitates or predestines exclusion or deportation.”);
Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 599 (2015) (discussing how “restructuring social categories, diminishing economic
and political power” has perpetuated the marginalization of the Latino population).
30. NGAI, supra note 15, at 2.
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The Court’s recent equal protection jurisprudence in immigration
cases31 represents the interplay of plenary power and the intent doctrine as
overlapping and mutually reinforcing mechanisms enabling racial
discrimination.32 But even without plenary power, the intent doctrine
necessitates reimagining immigration equal protection claims to receive
serious consideration.33 The current guidelines for identifying
discriminatory intent, established by the Court’s decision in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., has
facilitated a narrow reading of the evidentiary record—particularly, the
disparate impact and historical background factors.34 The problem was not
so much the Court’s framework, but rather, its application, or lack thereof,
including in Arlington. Without meaningful review of these factors to
prove discriminatory intent, in combination with plenary power, equal
protection challenges to facially neutral laws—laws that do not
discriminate on their face but burden a disfavored minority or group in
their impact—face a double barrier.
This Article contributes to immigration equal protection
jurisprudential discussions by exploring how equal protection could better
31. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (striking
down Equal Protection challenge to former President Trump’s rescission of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2017) (upholding the travel
ban which impacted primarily Muslim-majority countries).
32. As I explained in a previous essay,
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) v. Regents
exposes the equal protection doctrine’s failure to reach one of the most entrenched systems
of racial oppression in the United States—immigration law. The Regents Court considered
the lawfulness of the Trump [A]dministration’s criticized Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) rescission. Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano announced the DACA program on June 15, 2012, and it allowed DHS to
exercise discretion to defer removal of young noncitizens who met specific, and rigorous,
criteria to qualify for the program. By the time of the rescission, DHS had granted deferred
action to over 800,000 individuals. The rescission was effectuated via a facially raceneutral government action but with a documented disparate impact on Latinos and
surrounded by anti-Latino rhetoric. When a state action does not purport to discriminate
overtly on the basis of race, the Court analyzes equal protection claims via the intent
doctrine, or by looking at the intent of the lawmaker. In Regents, in spite of considerable
evidence of discriminatory intent—disparate impact and discriminatory rhetoric—the
Court dismissed the equal protection challenge, instead invalidating the policy on
Administrative Procedure Act [] grounds. The Court sidestepped equal protection scrutiny
through an unsatisfying combination of “plenary power,” a doctrine that grants great legal
deference to the political branch, and the intent doctrine, which also ultimately affords
great deference to the government actor accused of discrimination.
Carrie L. Rosenbaum, (Un)Equal Immigration Protection, 50 SW. L. REV. 231, 232–33 (2021)
(internal citations omitted).
33. See generally Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis
of Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481 (2015)
(describing the limitations of equal protection in crimmigration enforcement).
34. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
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protect immigrants.35 First, it briefly explains the origins of the equal
protection intent doctrine and its existing state, which are relevant to
challenges to facially neutral government action with discriminatory
impact. Second, it highlights the intent doctrine’s shortcomings as well as
the role of the plenary power doctrine in immigration constitutional law
cases. Third, after establishing these frameworks, this Article discusses a
crimmigration statute36—8 U.S.C. § 1325, which criminalizes illegal
entry—to consider how a court might approach a hypothetical
immigration detention equal protection claim.37 In doing so, this Article
articulates ways in which the existing doctrine could be interpreted to
better align with equality principles. Fourth, this Article explores a
hypothetical challenge to immigration imprisonment at the United States–
Mexico border to underscore the fundamental limitations of the doctrine.
Fifth, and finally, this Article ends with preliminary considerations that
would increase the likelihood that the hypothetical challenge would be
validated. It also includes a short discussion of how critical race theorist
Derrick Bell’s concept of interest convergence applies to immigration
equal protection challenges at least as well as it did in Bell’s original one:
the Cold War with Russia. This discussion shows how enhancing equal
protection review in immigration asylum and detention cases is
desirable—and feasible—doctrinally. Ending cruelty at our border will
also help the United States demonstrate adherence to democratic values
35. See Jenny-Brooke Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 563
(2017); Chin, supra note 14; Johnson, supra note 14.
36. A “crimmigration statute” describes a federal law at the intersection of criminal and
immigration law. Since Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in 2006, scholars have created
a vast body of work on the subject interrogating the significance of the relationship between criminal
and immigration law, particularly with respect to individual rights. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006); see, e.g.,
Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. L. REV. 709, 710 (2015) (using a
framework of “legal liminality” to encourage “crimmigration scholarship” to examine “its deeper
theoretical grounding in membership theory” and engage in more “discussion of the role that race,
class, and place play in structuring governance strategies”); see also César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Crimmigration Realities & Possibilities, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2018) (symposium
commemorating crimmigration law’s origins and “crimmigration law’s intellectual contribution”);
Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit, supra note 23, at 120 (due process in
crimmigration detention).
37. This exercise will demonstrate the failure of equal protection, particularly in immigration
law. At the same time, it reinforces calls for deeper systemic change in line with recent advocacy. See
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement
in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/
george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/89BB-KJ9J]; Elaine Godfrey, What ‘Abolish
ICE’ Actually Means, THE ATLANTIC (July 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/07/what-abolish-ice-actually-means/564752/ [https://perma.cc/76YR-S4YN]. Even short of
systemic change, by examining some of the complex history of equal protection challenges to facially
neutral discriminatory laws, it will demonstrate the ways in which the law used to be more effective,
and how it could be, once again.
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and exhibit the kind of moral authority that has historically played a role
in domestic and international politics.38
I. EQUAL PROTECTION INTENT DOCTRINE
An equal protection challenge to a facially neutral law with
discriminatory impact hinges on the intent doctrine. Even without the
exceptionalism of immigration law, disparate impact challenges to
criminal or civil laws are put through a rigorous and muddled test that has
evolved over the past five decades.39 Critics contend that, while there were
moments where the pre-1970s intent doctrine held promise for racial
justice, it has evolved to undermine protection of racial minorities from
government harm.40
The analytic elements established by the Arlington Court that
dominate the analysis of such claims have potential to both better unpack
the machinations of institutionalized discrimination and advance equality
goals. One recent district court opinion demonstrated the potential of the
Arlington framework.41 However, each jurist’s power to continually
38. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision on desegregation was
motivated in part by international affairs, the United States’ Cold War strategy, and the significance
of the United States being perceived as having moral authority and a laudable democracy); Robert S.
Chang, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination (Part III): Aoki, Rawls, and
Immigration, 90 OR. L. REV. 1319, 1326–27 (2012) (describing the way in which foreign policy
influenced immigration law in the context of World War II and the 1943 legislation finally allowing
Chinese nationals to become U.S. citizens) (first citing Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
War Imperative, 41 STAN L. REV. 61 (1988); then citing RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A
DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 377 (1989); then citing Neil Gotanda, Towards
Repeal of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309
(Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1996); and then citing John Hayakawa Torok, “Interest Convergence” and the
Liberalization of Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asians, 1943–1965,
in CHINESE AMERICA: HISTORY & PERSPECTIVES 1 (Marlon K. Hom et al. eds., 1995)); see also Sudha
Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185, 187 (2012) (bringing
interest convergence theory into the post 9/11 context and proposing ways the nation’s interest could
be served in the international arena by addressing rights and cross-ideological coalitions domestically).
39. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
40. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You?: Addressing
McCleskey v. Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk of
Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2018); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1277–80
(1997); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935,
967–72 (1989); see also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 703–04 (2006) (describing the liberal scholarly perspective on Davis); K.G. Jan Pillai,
Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 525, 531 (2001) (“[T]he invidious
intent doctrine is hopelessly adrift, having no certainty in meaning or consistency in application.”).
41. United States v. Rios-Montano, No. 19-CR-2123-GPC, 2020 WL 7226441, at *7–8 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 8, 2020); see discussion infra Section II.B.
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disregard this possibility suggests the importance of an analysis that can
explore deeper questions of remedies to historically systematized
inequality.42
The level of scrutiny triggered in an equal protection challenge—
strict, intermediate, or rational basis—is largely determinative of the
outcome.43 When a law does not facially target a suspect classification,
such as national origin or race, heightened scrutiny does not apply. Thus,
a facially neutral law is only invalidated by establishing a discriminatory
purpose, or intent, on the part of the government.44
As the equal protection doctrine evolved, state actors adapted to
avoid strict scrutiny by discriminating by proxy.45 Discrimination by
proxy can occur when instead of naming a suspect classification, like
“Mexican nationals” (national origin), “Latinos” (race), “Muslims”
(religion), or immigration status (alienage), a law or state action uses the
Spanish language or another neutral feature to target the group in
question.46 There was a time where the intent doctrine allowed the Court
to uncover covert classifications so they might not evade more rigorous
examination,47 such as discrimination that is not effectuated via a
designated protected class but instead by proxy.
The intent doctrine is described as having progressive, anti-racist
origins.48 However, it evolved in a way that masks proxy discrimination
42. See infra Section V. I intend to expand on this idea in a subsequent article.
43. When the Court applies strict scrutiny, the government faces a higher likelihood of losing
because its action receives the least degree of deference. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–74 (2007).
44. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)
(“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
45. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1118
(1989) (“After the Court made clear that racial and some other sensitive classifications would receive
heightened scrutiny, however, governments tried to circumvent equal protection by discriminating by
proxy.”); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 172 (2016) (“[S]trict
scrutiny rarely benefits people of color because modern racial discrimination does not rely on overt
racial classifications to do its dirty work.”).
46. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of
Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2000)
(arguing that California Proposition 227 constituted unlawful racial anti-Latinx discrimination by
proxy of language).
47. See Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2016), for a discussion on the intent doctrine’s history and “the realignment of Equal
Protection doctrine away from racial justice aims.”
48. Professor Eyer explains,
It would no doubt [be a] surprise . . . to hear [the] intent doctrine described as one of the
major racial justice victories of the Brown v. Board of Education era . . . . Understanding
this progressive history of intent doctrine has important implications. There are strong
reasons to believe that these early progressive struggles to establish intent-based
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because the party challenging the law must prove improper motivation or
“malicious intent,” yet Justices are not necessarily demonstrating
commitment to uncovering discriminatory motivation or “mindsets.”49
The requirement of discriminatory intent evolved to foster hyper deference
to government action, treating legislative decisions as void of
discriminatory intent where a race-neutral proxy stands in for what would
have been a suspect class. To prove improper motivation, the challenging
party must show that race was a motivating factor, and that the state could
not have reached the same result in another nondiscriminatory manner.50
Before the late 1970s, the Court considered intent as “a broadly
informed inferential approach that focused on motives only in the loosest
sense (and sometimes not at all)” and focused on discriminatory effects.51
Prior to the mid-1970s, a facially neutral government action could violate
equal protection, and a government actor’s intent was potentially
“irrelevant if the circumstances as a whole and discriminatory impact
suggested an equal protection violation.”52
A. The Shift in Intent Jurisprudence
Equal protection challenges to facially neutral laws shifted away
from protectiveness over the course of the 1970s and 1980s.53 In the shift
invalidation helped facilitate the 1970s-era conservative turn in intent doctrine that
progressive scholars today decry. Thus, although the normative valence of intent doctrine
shifted from progressive to conservative in the early to mid-1970s, progressive and
moderate Justices on the Court were slow to realign their own doctrinal preferences. As a
result, the Court’s progressive wing rarely resisted—and at times aided—the conservative
doctrinal developments of the mid- to late 1970s.
Id.
49. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1858 (2012) (suggesting
that “malicious intent disguised . . . the consolidation of a majority of Justices disposed to find no
discrimination against non-Whites” and in fact the “exhortations to prove malice were never about
calling for evidence of illicit motives,” but instead were indicative of a preference for “excluding
contextual proof of continued discrimination” and, this author suggests, facilitating proxy
discrimination); Eyer, supra note 47, at 34, 47 (describing this transition as a “[d]rift [t]owards
[i]ntent-[m]andatory [e]qual [p]rotection,” with the Court’s “race liberals” choosing the intent over
effects methodology as indicated by their decision in Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1).
50. Ortiz, supra note 45 (“But by asking . . . whether the same result ‘could’ have, rather than
‘would’ have, been reached, the Court seriously subverts the overall process.”).
51. Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1785; see, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971).
52. Rosenbaum, supra note 33, at 239; Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1789 (characterizing
intent in the Court’s “racial jurisprudence” through about 1977 as a consideration of the circumstances
as a whole—an example being pervasive Jim Crow practices negating the need to examine the intent
of the specific government decisionmakers responsible for a challenged state action); see also Palmer,
403 U.S. at 225.
53. Before the intent doctrine, the Court only looked for express discrimination on the face of a
law whereas the intent doctrine originally evolved to create a path to invalidate state action that was
implicitly discriminatory, before then shifting away from being a check on implicit discrimination.
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from situational scrutiny of racially discriminatory intent or “effects-based
invalidation,”54 the Court determined it could not and should not speculate
the lawmaker’s motivation (or intent).55 The Court reasoned that such a
consideration was futile because the purpose motivating a government
actor’s legislative action is highly subjective, making it hard to discern,56
and legislators could usually find a way to reimplement the legislation
without evidence of the alleged invidious intent.57 Yet the Court moved
towards rejecting the possibility that a government action and its impact
could produce anticipated outcomes that were reasonably intended.58
By 1976, the Supreme Court foreclosed recognition of structural
inequality by circumscribing intent in Washington v. Davis.59 After
Washington, implicit consideration of motives behind a government action
was no longer a part of the equal protection analysis and racial impact
alone was insufficient to show a discriminatory purpose.60 A year later, the
See Eyer, supra note 48, at 1 (“[T]he normative valence of intent doctrine shifted from progressive to
conservative in the early to mid-1970s.”); see also id. at 16 (“Faced with the reality of the laws’
segregationist aims—and their apparently indefinite effectiveness in forestalling integration—a small
number of judges began to look behind the text of facially neutral laws to invalidate them based on
intent.”).
54. See Eyer, supra note 47, at 48–50.
55. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
56. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1973) (“The search for legislative purpose
is often elusive. . . . Legislation is frequently multipurposed.”); Arlington, 429 U.S. at 265 (“Rarely
can it be said that a legislature . . . operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one. In fact, it
is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing
considerations the courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions[.]”).
57. See, e.g., Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225.
58. E.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210–11 (1973).
59. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976).
60. See Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1785 (describing Davis as “the source of today’s failed
doctrine, insofar as it required direct proof regarding the minds of government actors”). Post-Davis,
the intent doctrine was also stymied in part by the Court’s bifurcation of the intent inquiry into a twopart test. First the Court considers whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that race was a
motivating factor, and the inquiry can end there. If a preponderance of the evidence does show that
race was a motivating factor, the equal protection claim can still be defeated when the Court
subsequently considers whether the state would be able to show that it would have reached the same
result anyway. See Ortiz, supra note 45. If a plaintiff cannot show discriminatory purpose, the
government is not required to offer a “racially neutral explanation” for “unequal effects” and a
challenged government action does not receive scrutiny beyond the rational basis test. Barnes &
Chemerinksy, supra note 40, at 1301. Pursuant to this test, the Court will validate a discriminatory
government action if it determines that it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). However, even in a discriminatory impact case, the
Court can apply strict scrutiny to a facially neutral law. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222
(1985); Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. “Beyond . . . legitimating a simplistic conception of racism, Davis set
back equal protection along two other dimensions: (1) in adopting a rigid on-off approach to
heightened review and (2) in closing off the possibility of responding to structural inequality.” Haney-
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Court affirmed this foreclosure in Arlington: an “official action” would not
be “held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact.”61 The Court emphasized that only proof that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor would eliminate judicial
deference.62 The Arlington ruling embodies the evolution of the modern
intent doctrine and is the primary test today.
The Arlington Court did not explicitly spell out or mandate a
particular test, but instead provided that discriminatory motivation could
be proven by objective factors. These factors include “[t]he historical
background of the [governmental actor’s] decision . . . , particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.”63 Other
factors might include departures from normal procedures, legislative and
administrative history, contemporary statements by members of the
decision-making body, and a specific series of events leading up to the
challenged action.64
The factors frequently result in narrow review of an evidentiary
record and are blind to institutionalized racism, particularly of the sort of
endemic to immigration law. 65 Additionally, subsequent decisions further
narrowed consideration of discriminatory purpose. This includes the
malicious–intent requirement from the Personal Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney decision, which made direct proof of injurious
motives a prerequisite and eliminated relevance of situational evidence.66
López, supra note 49, at 1812 (italics added); see also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence
of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 747 (1994) (explaining that critical race theorists critiqued
not just the Court’s faulty decision, but “the understanding of racism on which that test is based”);
Lawrence, supra note 15, at 944 (noting that if equality was the goal, Davis’ flaw was its “motivecentered inquiry” because it required “that we identify a perpetrator, a bad guy wearing a white sheet
and hood”).
61. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 259, 264–65 (finding that it was not enough that the “ultimate effect”
of a policy was racially discriminatory; proof of government or state actor “discriminatory intent” was
required). The Supreme Court uniformly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach, effectively using a
recklessness standard and “faulting it for disregarding known racially segregationist effects.” Eyer,
supra note 47, at 57.
62. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266.
63. Id. at 267.
64. See, e.g., id. at 266–68.
65. Before Arlington, in response to Plessy v. Ferguson, there was a limited time where the Court
embraced jurisprudence looking “behind the text of facially neutral laws to invalidate them based on
intent” in a manner much more expansive than what would become the Arlington factors. Eyer, supra
note 47, at 16.
66. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 & n.25 (1979) (“the inevitability or
foreseeability of consequences of a neutral rule” might, but need not, have bearing upon the existence
of a discriminatory intent). The Feeney Court required proof of the government action evincing an
“illegitimate purpose,” conscious antipathy, or malice to find intent. Id. at 264; see also HaneyLópez, supra note 49, at 1833 (elaborating on how the Court also rejected the notion that a person
intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of voluntary actions (citing Siegel, supra note 40, at
1135)).
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And, any nondiscriminatory, legitimate government purpose insulates the
government act from an equal protection challenge. Requiring proof that
government actors harbored “malicious intent” became a technique for not
finding discrimination.67
The Court’s narrow review of the evidentiary record along with the
newly adopted malicious intent standard is largely responsible for the
outcome in McCleskey v. Kemp. Following McCleskey, showing
discriminatory purpose requires “proof that the government desired to
discriminate;” therefore, proof that the government acted with knowledge
of its discriminatory consequences does not suffice.68 Most notably, the
McCleskey Court rejected the notion that historical evidence and statistical
data of discriminatory impact, even combined, could evince malicious
intent.69
McCleskey stemmed from an equal protection challenge in criminal
law, where racial bias or disparity is particularly visible as it is in
immigration law.70 Nonetheless, contrary to the logic of the Arlington
Court’s implications, the McCleskey Court ignored the significance of the
history of slavery, racial oppression, and their relationship with the
criminal justice system, and declared that historical evidence did not prove
current intent.71
This new standard from Arlington and its progeny became nearly
impenetrable; it states a need for “real evidence” of discriminatory intent
but declines to do the work to decode mental states or grapple with
historical background evidence or contemporary statements of decisionmaking bodies.72 By the time lawmakers learned to cleanse government
67. Mario L. Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky contend that the Court’s requirement of proving
discriminatory purpose or intent for the past four decades misapprehends the reason for and purpose
of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection as far as preventing the government from “act[ing]
in a manner that harms racial minorities, regardless of why it took the action.” Barnes & Chemerinksy,
supra note 40, at 1302.
68. Barnes & Chemerinksy, supra note 40; see Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court
Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some
Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2018) (critiquing McCleskey’s stance on
statistical evidence, contending that “[t]hree decades of living with McCleskey teaches that it is
important to design remedies for bias in the criminal justice system that do not depend solely on judges
for their implementation”).
69. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296–97 (1987).
70. It is visible particularly with respect to the ethnic or racial composition of criminal and
immigration prisons.
71. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 n.20. In Justice Brennan’s dissent, he considered the
significance of the history of slavery and racial oppression and their relationship to the criminal justice
system. See id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For many years, Georgia operated openly and
formally precisely the type of dual system the evidence shows is still effectively in place. The criminal
law expressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against blacks and whites, distinctions
whose lineage traced back to the time of slavery.”).
72. See Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1787–88.
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acts of racial or other classifications based on protected status, the Court
already adopted an interpretation of the intent doctrine that evaded intent
detection when it was not explicit in the government action.73 Even as
social science research on implicit bias has flourished and legal scholars
and advocates engaged with it,74 the Court generally does not consider the
“actual motives of today’s government officials” or use the tools at its
disposal to consider the role of implicit bias. 75 This line of cases exposes
an “ideological drift” away from the brief period of effects-based
invalidation.76
B. The Arlington Factors in Recent Crimmigration Jurisprudence
In immigration law, like in criminal law, much is at stake for
individuals experiencing disparate impact of an implicitly discriminatory
law.77 The pattern of racial profiling and racially disproportionate impacts
73. As an example, Katie Eyer describes the shift after Brown v. Board of Education where
Southern legislators found race-neutral ways to achieve the same results struck down as unequal. Eyer,
supra note 47, at 12 n.44 (“Many states adopted both facially neutral and facially discriminatory
measures in resistance to Brown, often within a single package of legislation.”) The practice persists
today, particularly in light of colorblind racism. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the
Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin,
102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1119–20 (2017) (explaining how “strategies, practices, and tactics for
protecting whiteness and its attendant advantages and benefits have shifted from explicit actions in
thwarting, punishing, and even violently resisting challenges to black racial subordination and white
authority to ostensibly ‘race-neutral’ actions that . . . legal scholar Ian Haney López calls
‘commonsense racism,’ and that sustain a form of rationalizing racial inequities and injustices that
sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva refers to as ‘colorblind racism’) (internal citations omitted);
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA 2 (4th ed. 2014); see also Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Poverty as a Proxy for Race in Voter
Suppression, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/opinion/republicanvoter-suppression.html [https://perma.cc/B72A-2E6D].
74. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT
SHAPES WHAT WE SEE, THINK, AND DO (2019).
75. Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1856, 1877 n.339; see also Gayle Binion, “Intent” and Equal
Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 441–42 (“Because it must be shown that the
decisionmakers were motivated by that which they deny, the plaintiffs must prove them to be liars.”);
Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1231 (2018) (“[W]hile the
idea of ‘discriminatory intent’ has served since 1976 as an organizing principle in Equal Protection
jurisprudence, the Court has not hewed to a clear and specific understanding of such ‘intent,’ or a
single understanding of how it is to be proved.”).
76. See generally Eyer, supra note 47.
77. See Ian F. Haney-López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2010) (“fighting crime became a seemingly
‘obvious’ framework for responding to social problems,” including immigration without
authorization); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
257, 298 (2017) (dissecting the problems with “earned citizenship” and “reinforce[ing] the immigrantas-criminal narrative that restrictionists so regularly invoke”). See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond
Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 207 (2012) (exploring “the polarized narratives told about ‘good’ and ‘bad’
immigrants” and proposing challenging “broader societal narratives” in advocacy efforts); Luna
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persists, as does the limited viability of equal protection challenges to
facially neutral practices. Arlington can be, and has been, applied to
examine whether a facially neutral criminal immigration law violates
equal protection.78
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California decision, United States v. Rios-Montano, the court examined
historical evidence of racially discriminatory intent using the Arlington
framework to evaluate an equal protection challenge to a crimmigration
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1325, criminalizing illegal entry.79 The Rios-Montano
decision provides insight into how an equal protection claim could be
adjudicated in a challenge to the immigration statute analyzed in Part IV.80
The Rios-Montano court rejected the government’s plenary power
argument, stating “the federal government’s plenary power over
immigration matters does not provide it license to enact racially
discriminatory statutes in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment.”81 Specifically, the court declared the statute was “not
insulated from scrutiny[,]” noting that the crimmigration statute was
facially race-neutral.82 The court determined that Rios-Montano had
demonstrated disparate impact.83
However, after the court looked at the statute’s historical
background, it determined that it had to consider Congress’ intent in
passing the statute’s current iteration (from 1990, not the 1929 original),
which had been purged of its discriminatory intent.84 Relying on an
affidavit of an immigration historian, the court examined the historical
context of the 1929 congressmembers’ motivation to criminalize unlawful
entry, which showed that they were motivated “at least in part, because of
Martinez G. & Kiki Tapiero, Essay, Prax-Is in Action: A Resistance Toolkit for Family Separations at
the Border, 29 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 51, 55–56 (2019) (discussing immigrant as criminal in the
context of advancing a praxis-based approach to address family separations at the border).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Rios-Montano, No. 19-CR-2123-GPC, 2020 WL 7226441, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020).
79. See id.
80. Rios-Montano and the hypothetical claim I lay out in Part IV both concern claims by Mexican
and Latinx individuals with respect to prosecution at the border; the Rios-Montano statute criminalizes
illegal entry, whereas the immigration statute that will be examined below addresses immigration
detention at the border, presumably to deter migration. Similarly, prosecution for illegal entry is meant
to deter migration.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *1–2, *8. Pursuant to Washington v. Davis disparate impact under Arlington, the court
specifically noted that it did not require a showing that a law both had a discriminatory purpose and
was also not neutrally applied. Id. at *7 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
The Rios-Montano court suggested that the disparate impact in Arlington was comparable to the
disparate impact of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 on Mexicans and Latinx individuals apprehended at the border.
Id. at *7–8.
84. Id. at *5–8.
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their endorsement of eugenics and opposition to the ‘Mexican race.’85 In
disavowing a connection between the earlier statute and its reenactment,
the court refused to grapple with the deeply entrenched roots of racist and
racializing crimmigration harm.
Indicative of the challenges of parsing legislative history for
discriminatory intent, the Rios-Montano court said that the 1990 law
evinced a “180-degree turn away from the racist tropes that accompanied
the enactment of the 1929 immigration law.”86 In finding the current
version lacked discriminatory intent, the court outlined the diverse,
bipartisan supporters of the bill; the lack of overt racism; and the
endorsements of the 1990 law by civil rights groups. 87 However, the
Arlington Court never mandated this analysis of assessing whether express
racial bias surrounding an earlier iteration of a law or government act had
been purged. Relying on the Arlington factors, the Rios-Montano court
could have found that the related history of bias was enough.
Politics makes strange bedfellows (as the saying goes), which adds
to the complicated nature of understanding and pinpointing evidence of
discriminatory intent. In the case of Rios-Montano, an endorsement of a
broad, sweeping statute by reputedly progressive organizations was
considered evidence that the law lacked implicit bias.88 The legislative
process is so complex and obscure that attempting to interpret legislative
intent is futile.89 While it may be true that the competing policy
preferences of advocacy organizations and interest groups can result in
compromises that “form rational, beneficial legislative outcomes,” such
outcomes may still reflect systemic bias.90 While the Rios-Montano court
engaged in a somewhat expansive view of the legislative history, it put too
much, or the wrong kind of, emphasis on certain aspects of that history.
Outside of the equal protection context, the Court has more
effectively grappled with the role of race. In Ramos v. Louisiana, a
criminal jury trial case, Justice Sotomayor employed aspects of the
85. Id. at *3.
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id. at *5–7.
88. The court may have attributed meaning to the endorsements that was not there or was
inaccurate. It is possible that the endorsements were a result of political compromise to avoid a less
desirable outcome, perhaps having nothing to do with race. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003) (“[L]egislative preferences do not pass unfiltered into
legislation; they are distilled through a carefully designed process that requires legislation to clear
several distinct institutions, numerous veto gates, the threat of a Senate filibuster, and countless other
procedural devices that temper unchecked majoritarianism. . . . [P]recise lines drawn by any statute
may reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or even
an implicit legislative decision to forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision.”).
89. Id.
90. John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 380
(2013).
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Arlington equal protection intent analysis when considering a Sixth
Amendment challenge to Louisiana’s racially face-neutral statute
requiring two juror votes to acquit and prevent a criminal conviction.91 The
Court considered the history of discriminatory intent in the creation of the
statute,92 and ultimately struck down the jury rules because of their racist
origins.93 However, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the importance of
avoiding too narrow of an approach to historical evidence of bias and
presenting too low of a bar for assessing whether a law lacks racially
discriminatory motive. Justice Sotomayor proposed a potential additional
hurdle: “[P]erhaps also where a legislature actually confronts a law’s
tawdry past in reenacting it —the new law may well be free of
discriminatory taint.”94 Perhaps eliminating the stain of the racialized past
should require consideration of how it manifests now via structural racism,
and should require affirmative action not just symbolically, but to move
towards equality.95
There have been glimmers of movement towards more complex
analyses of the historic role of race in invalidating statutes on equal
protection grounds. In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court relied on Arlington
and considered evidence of historical background to strike down a facially
neutral provision in Alabama’s state constitution restricting voting.96
Relying on historian testimony and historical academic literature, the
Court found that racial discriminatory purpose “was a ‘but-for’

91. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1408–10 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
(“Although Ramos does not bring an equal protection challenge, the history is worthy of this Court’s
attention.”).
92. Id. at 1394 (majority opinion).
93. The Louisiana law’s origins were an 1898 constitutional convention, where the state
endorsed unanimous verdicts, and a committee chairman stated that the intention of the convention
was to “establish the supremacy of the white race.” Id. Convention delegates were savvy enough to
hide their overt racism in documents produced by the convention and “sculpted a ‘facially raceneutral’” rule. Id. Oregon’s law had come about in a similar manner and was “traced to the rise of the
Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon
juries.’” Id. (citation omitted). The Court expressed confusion as to why laws with origins in white
supremacy and racism still existed. Id. In deeming the law unconstitutional, the majority disagreed
with Justice Alito’s dissenting argument that both states subsequent recodification without referencing
race was sufficient to cure the laws original animus and the Court had to consider “the very functions
those rules were adopted to serve.” Id. at 1440 n.44.
94. Id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
95. Id. (emphasizing the need to recognize racialized history where “the States’ legislatures never
truly grappled with the laws’ sordid history in reenacting them” and explaining that policies
“‘traceable’ to a State’s de jure racial segregation . . . still ‘have discriminatory effects’ [that] offend
the Equal Protection Clause” (citing United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992))).
96. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (highlighting that the result of the provision
by 1903 had a disproportionate disenfranchisement of Black compared to White potential voters by
ten times); see also Eyer, supra note 47, at 66 (arguing that “in Hunter, intent doctrine would stand as
the champion of racial justice, rather than an obstacle to its effectuation”).
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motivation” for the law’s original enactment.97 While Hunter is largely an
anomaly, it is a reminder of what the intent doctrine could do if the
evidentiary record received relevant weight.98
Even without setting foot into the realm of immigration
exceptionalism, the current equal protection intent doctrine has
shortcomings, though there are signs of potential improvement.99 Tracing
equal protection challenges to facially neutral laws may be instructive in
hypothesizing how a court might analyze an equal protection challenge to
an immigration law that uses incarceration to deter migration from Mexico
and Central America.
II. IMMIGRATION UNEQUAL PROTECTION
While it began overtly, “the racial history of immigration policy has
become institutionalized so that seemingly neutral policies actually have
racial effects.”100 However, equal protection challenges to facially neutral
immigration laws face a double barrier of the plenary power and intent
doctrine. The Court has cordoned off immigration law as exceptional,
distinguishing it from criminal law and other categories of civil or
administrative law, deeming the Legislative and Executive Branches’
power at their apex when making immigration law.101 Even though the
language of the Constitution does not confine the Equal Protection Clause
to United States citizens, the Court has interpreted noncitizens to lack full
97. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229–232. It is possible that the Court’s willingness to examine the intent
of the lawmakers was influenced by the fact that the lawmakers were long gone, and those responsible
were “attendees at a 1901 Alabama constitutional convention” where, even reputedly conservative
Justice Rehnquist remarked, the ‘zeal for white supremacy ran rampant.’” Haney-López, supra note
49, at 1855 (“[The law] was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks.” (citing Hunter, 471
U.S. at 229)).
98. In a recent voting rights case, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a law criminalizing third-party
ballot collection because the legislative history and the events leading to its passage demonstrated
discriminatory intent. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1040–42 (9th Cir. 2020)
(en banc) (finding equal protection violation where some lawmakers that voted for the law had a
“sincere, though mistaken, non-race based belief” that voting misconduct was a problem because the
belief was “fraudulently created” by a “racially tinged” campaign ad and supported by well-intended
legislators may still be tainted by discriminatory intent as a result of “false and race-based” claims of
other legislators).
99. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Inside-out Constitution: Department of Commerce v. New
York, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 247 (2020); see also Robinson, supra note 45, at 172–73; Siegel, supra
note 40, at 1139–46; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1991) (explaining that intent in the “color-blind” equal protection doctrine serves as
subterfuge for avoiding acknowledging continuing racism). The Ramos decision suggests a possibility
of new methods to address racial harm within existing frameworks with, or without, equal protection.
See generally Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
100. Hing, supra note 10, at 310.
101. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993).
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entitlement to constitutional protection. 102 In the realm of equal protection
in immigration law, the Court has shown greater deference to the
Legislative and Executive Branches at the expense of protecting individual
rights because of its plenary power.103 This is particularly true in the
context of due process claims for those seeking admission at the border
and subject to expedited removal. Their constitutional rights are at their
nadir particularly after the 2020 Supreme Court decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, where the Court held that
immigrants who have recently arrived at the border have no procedural
due process rights.104
The people whose individual rights are most often limited by plenary
power are racialized noncitizens of color who have been historically,
politically, socially, and culturally marginalized and demonized.105 Racebased discrimination in immigration law, what Professor Gabriel Chin
twenty years ago called “segregation’s last stronghold,”106 originates with
102. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1988).
103. David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 81, 145 (2013) (explaining that “immigrant advocates” have long “excoriated” foreign
affairs as justification for the plenary power doctrine).
104. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1961 (2020) (internal citation
omitted) (limiting judicial review of individuals charged under the expedited removal statute at the
border citing plenary power and concluding that “more than a century of precedent establishes that,
for aliens seeking initial entry, ‘the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law’”); see Vanessa M. Garza, Unheard
and Deported: The Unconstitutional Denial of Habeas Corpus in Expedited Removal, 56 HOUS. L.
REV. 881, 881 (2019) (explaining that “writ of habeas corpus, ensured by the Constitution, is the only
avenue for immigrants contesting an unlawful detention under expedited removal”); Fatma E. Marouf,
Extraterritorial Rights in Border Enforcement, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 759 (2020) (contending
that “extending constitutional protections, preserving judicial review, and critically examining
demands for deference are crucial in this context in order to avoid creating a law-free zone just beyond
our southern border”); Leading Case, Article I—Suspension Clause—Expedited Removal
Challenges—Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 134 HARV. L. REV. 410, 419 (2020)
(analyzing Thuraissigiam and concluding “in upholding the limited judicial review accorded to asylum
seekers subject to expedited removal, Thuraissigiam created methodological confusion that may lead
to narrow interpretations of the Suspension Clause and further entrenched the increasingly expansive,
‘shadowy regime’ of expedited removal”) (citation omitted).
105. The Court has consistently upheld Congress’ ability to exclude “aliens of a particular race.”
See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reasoning that the Court must defer to Congress even
when immigration policy relies on “discredited racial theories[,] anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism”);
Stranahan, 214 U.S. at 336; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261 (1905); United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896);
cf. Flores, 507 U.S. at 305–06 (“[I]n the exercise of its broad power over immigration and
naturalization, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392; Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
106. Chin, supra note 14, at 5.
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immigration law itself; but at the same time, equal protection has barely
touched it. This phenomenon is partially explained by the way in which
the intent doctrine fosters the ability of language and immigration status
to serve as proxies for racial discrimination in immigration law.107 Of the
immigration-related equal protection claims the Court heard in 2020
concerning noncitizens or historically disadvantaged groups, none
prevailed.108
A. The Court’s Reliance on National Security at the Expense of
Constitutional Rights
Because immigration law raises sovereignty and national security
concerns,109 the Court affords the government more leeway in engaging in
practices that would otherwise be deemed intolerable. The perniciousness
of plenary power began in 1889. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,110
the Court determined that Congress’s decision to exclude Chinese
immigrants on the basis of race fell within its sovereign power and not that
of judges.111 This history overlapped with the Court’s upholding of racial
segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.112
Not only does the plenary power doctrine signify great deference to
Congress in making immigration law, but, like the intent doctrine, it
signals the Court’s unwillingness to probe a superficial rationalization of
“national security” when Congress needs a nondiscriminatory justification

107. See Johnson & Martinez, supra note 46, at 1230 (contending that California Proposition
227 constituted unlawful racial anti-Latino discrimination by proxy of language, though the author
notes that Proposition 227 was a state alienage rather than immigration law); see also Alfredo
Mirande, “Now That I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar [‘I’m Not Allowed to Speak’]”: The
Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 115, 132 (1996); Susan Kiyomi
Serrano, Comment, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yniguez and the Racialization of
English Only, 19 U. OF HAW. L. REV. 221, 224–26 (1997) (suggesting that it may be appropriate to
treat the notion of “race” as including language for certain applications of equal protection strict
scrutiny claims).
108. Chacón, supra note 100, at 235–36 (arguing that the fate of the equal protection claim in
the Census 2020 Case is a logical sequel to the fate of the First Amendment discrimination claim in
the Muslim Exclusion Case, Trump v. Hawaii, where both cases “illustrate the near impossibility of
vindicating claims of racial or religious animus against historically disadvantaged groups under
existing constitutional antidiscrimination jurisprudence”).
109. See generally Martin, supra note 13 (exploring why the plenary power doctrine endures);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 558 (1990) (exploring the partial erosion of
the plenary power doctrine, somewhat indirectly, through statutory interpretation).
110. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
111. Id.; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 722 (1893).
112. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). But note that on the same day as it upheld
segregation in Plessy, the Court in Wong Wing v. United States struck down part of
the Chinese Exclusion Act in requiring imprisonment of unauthorized Chinese in the United States.
Chin, supra note 15, at 43 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 228 (1896)).
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for an otherwise discriminatory law.113 From the first plenary power case
to reference national security—Chinese Exclusion Case114—to one of the
more recent—Trump v. Hawaii115—the Court has not demonstrated an
actual threat to national security. In the infamous plenary power Japanese
internment case, the racialized restraint on liberty was later revealed to
have been justified by an internally falsified threat to national security.116
Even without plenary power, the intent doctrine already results in
great deference to lawmakers because disproportionate impact is
insufficient to invalidate a law on equal protection grounds, and
discriminatory intent can be overcome by a showing of a
nondiscriminatory purpose.117 Accordingly, plenary power, which affords
special deference to both the Executive and Legislative Branches in
matters of immigration, is duplicative in a way that powerfully reinforces
the barrier to equal protection.118
The combination of intent and the plenary power doctrine in
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California (the DACA case) is an example of the Court’s narrow approach
to evidence while employing an already limited test to assess potential
discriminatory intent.119 Despite the transparently discriminatory rhetoric
and anti-immigration policies of the Trump administration,120 DACA
113. See Motomura, supra note 109, at 549 (contending that plenary power was being eroded
via statutory interpretation); Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive? National Security and the
Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 747 (2017) (while not every immigration case before
the Court presents an explicit national security justification for the actions of the political branches,
the ones that do reflect plenary power at its most robust).
114. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
115. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). It is quite possible that plenary power helps
explain why the Trump v. Hawaii Court chose rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny in spite
of evidence of discriminatory intent and impact.
116. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. at 2392.
117. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (suggesting that neutral law that
has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose); see also HaneyLópez, supra note 49, at 1831 (discussing disproportionate impact and disproportionately adverse
effect on a racial minority).
118. The combination of the two makes equal protection claims impossible to win in immigration
related claims. At the same time, the two doctrines do the same thing. Plenary power results in the
Court accepting any rationale the government offers in discriminating or limiting a substantive right
usually with just an utterance of “national security.” In the intent doctrine realm, a plausible alternative
justification to racial animus or motive is all that is needed to upend an equal protection claim.
119. See generally Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891
(2020).
120. See generally Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration
Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197 (2019) (writing two years into the Trump presidency that
white nationalism may be driving the Administration’s immigration policy); Rose Cuison Villazor &
Kevin R. Johnson, The Trump Administration and the War on Immigration Diversity, 54 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 575 (2019) (arguing that “the Administration’s initiatives together reveal the
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recipients are not a suspect class; even though they are almost exclusively
Latinx, thus DACA status is broadly understood as a proxy for race. Even
though the Court invalidated the rescission on other grounds, it rejected
the argument that the rescission of DACA violated plaintiffs’ rights under
equal protection.
Justice Sotomayor was the lone voice challenging the plurality’s
narrow application of the Arlington test to the evidentiary record.121 Justice
Sotomayor emphasized that nothing in the Court’s caselaw supported
disregarding any of the campaign or other statements as “remote in time
from later-enacted policies.”122 In addition, Justice Sotomayor criticized
the plurality’s dismissal of the history leading up to rescission and its
unwillingness to attribute the President’s anti-Latinx statements to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary’s decision to rescind
DACA.123 Through this “blinkered approach”124 the Court did not even
need to hide behind plenary power jurisprudence because of the
insurmountable hurdle of the intent doctrine.125
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
proclamation issued by the President prohibiting entry of noncitizens into
the United States from five majority-Muslim countries, North Korea, and
[E]xecutive [B]ranch’s overall war on immigration diversity” and “when situated within the history
of immigration laws and policies in the United States, the current war against immigration diversity
furthers the Administration’s broader goal of returning to pre-1965 immigration policies designed to
maintain a ‘white nation’”); Ernesto Sagás & Ediberto Román, Build the Wall and Wreck the System:
Immigration Policy in the Trump Administration, 26 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 22 (2020) (“[W]hile
hundreds of miles of actual walls are yet to be built, through executive order and policymaking, Trump
has succeeded in building barriers to exclude people of color from coming to the United States.”).
121. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1918 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). To elaborate further on this,
the Court considered some but not all of the factors set forth by the Arlington Court for demonstrating
discriminatory motivation or evidence of discriminatory intent.
To “plead animus,” the Court stated that the plaintiffs “must raise a plausible inference that
an ‘invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor’” in the administration’s
rescission. The evidence the Court considered was (1) the disparate impact on Latinx
individuals from Mexico who represent 78% of DACA recipients (ignoring the amicus
statistic that 90% of DACA beneficiaries are Latinx)[;] (2) the unusual history behind the
rescission[;] and (3) pre- and post-election statements by President Trump. However, the
Court dismissed them as not attributable to the DHS Secretary directly responsible for
technically rescinding DACA.
Rosenbaum, supra note 33 (internal citations omitted).
122. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). This misinterpretation
stemmed from the Court’s holding in Trump v. Hawaii. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438
n.3 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Government urges us to disregard the President’s
campaign statements. . . . [However,] courts must consider ‘the historical background of the decision
under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question,
and the legislative or administrative history.’” (citation omitted)).
123. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1918 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 1917.
125. Id. at 1915–16.
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Venezuela.126 This was not clearly a disparate impact case, but the
rationale, and particularly the role of plenary power, are relevant to
understanding how the Court might approach an equal protection
challenge to immigration detention at the border. Unlike in Regents, where
the President’s overtly discriminatory rhetoric could not be attributed to
the DHS Secretary directly responsible for rescinding DACA, the
proclamation here fell on the heels of the President’s anti-Muslim
statements, pre- and post-election, and indisputably would have, and has
had, a disproportionate discriminatory impact.127 Chief Justice Roberts
upheld the ban and rejected the argument that the national security
rationale was a pretext for anti-Muslim intentions and violated the
Establishment Clause.128 Under the cover of the plenary power doctrine,
the Court deemed the proclamation “facially neutral” with respect to
religion, applied rational basis review, and found the proclamation
survived that level of scrutiny.129
Reminiscent of the rationale in affirming the legality of Japanese
internment in Korematsu, the Court’s Trump v. Hawaii decision deemed
the alleged national security concern a weightier interest than the equal
protection and anti-discrimination norms embedded—albeit too
tenuously—in the Constitution. Dissenting Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg reminded the plurality that this logic was no different than “the
same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu.”130 In both Trump v. Hawaii
and Korematsu, the Court did not require the government to meet any
evidentiary burden regarding the claim of a national security threat.131
Instead, like Korematsu, the Trump v. Hawaii plurality “blindly accept[ed]
the Government’s misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy
motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a
superficial claim of national security.”132 The Court’s statement that it was
overruling Korematsu rang hollow because, effectively, it did not overrule

126. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (“[P]laintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the
Proclamation was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about vetting protocols
and national security were but pretexts for discriminating against Muslims.”). Those affected by the
proclamation included people attempting to return to school, and other pursuits, in the United States,
which they would have been authorized to do but for the ban.
127. “Plaintiffs therefore ask the Court to probe the sincerity of the stated justifications for the
policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which were made before the President took the
oath of office.” Id. at 2418.
128. See id. at 2417–19.
129. Id. at 2423. Admittedly, while discussing this case in the context of plenary power, there is
reason to believe the intent doctrine would still not have helped to establish discriminatory purpose.
Supra Part II.
130. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
131. Id. at 2447.
132. Id. at 2448.
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the case.133 It did so in name only, upholding and relying on the rationale
of Korematsu.134
B. The Effects of the Termination of TPS
Advocates in several cases have also raised equal protection
challenges to the Trump Administration’s termination of Temporary
Protected Status (TPS).135 The district courts that heard those cases found
in favor of the plaintiffs; one case has since been appealed to the Second
Circuit on this issue.136 Congress created the TPS program as a part of the
1991 amendments to the Immigration Act, which empowered DHS to
designate countries struck with civil unrest, violence, or natural disaster
and authorized TPS holders to remain in the United States and obtain work
permits.137

133. Karen Korematsu, Carrying on Korematsu: Reflections on My Father’s Legacy, 9 CALIF.
L. REV. ONLINE 95, 105 (2020) (“Although [the Court] correctly rejected the abhorrent race-based
relocation and incarceration of Japanese Americans, it failed to recognize—and reject—the rationale
that led to Korematsu.”); Lorraine K. Bannai, Korematsu Overruled? Far from It: The Supreme Court
Reloads the Loaded Weapon, 16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 897, 899–900 (2018) (“[W]hat still
persists is the very real danger that whenever the government claims its actions are based on national
security—even actions that may, in intent or impact, single out racial or religious groups—the courts
will, as they did in Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii, step aside and defer to the government’s
judgment, fail to serve their democratic function as a check on government power, and fail to protect
vulnerable communities as well as the rights and values contained in our constitution and laws.”); John
Ip, The Travel Ban, Judicial Deference, and the Legacy of Korematsu, 63 HOW. L.J. 153, 155 (2020)
(“Justice Sotomayor’s charge that the [Trump v. Hawaii] majority is guilty of repeating the error of
Korematsu is valid, and . . . Chief Justice Roberts’ attempt to cast Korematsu as an odious relic of the
benighted past, distant and unrelated to the travel ban litigation, is ultimately unconvincing.”).
134. Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned
and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J. F. 641, 648–49 (2019) (the Trump v. Hawaii Court effectively
recreated the Korematsu doctrine under another name); Richard A. Dean, Trump v. Hawaii Is
Korematsu All Over Again, 29 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 175, 176 (2019) (“In both cases, the Supreme
Court abandoned judicial review over alleged infringement of constitutional rights asserted by
American citizens arising from screening procedures. Trump v. Hawaii is Korematsu all over again.”).
135. See, e.g., Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Ramos v. Nielsen,
336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom, Ramos v. Wolf, 975
F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1916 (2020) (plurality opinion).
136. See Saget, 375 F. Supp. at 367.
137. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Attorney General was authorized
to administer the TPS program; designation authority was transferred from the Attorney General to
the Secretary of Homeland Security in 2003. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, 116 Stat. 2135. The Secretary of Homeland Security has discretion to issue TPS for periods of
six to eighteen months. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)–(2). Thereafter, the Secretary reviews the conditions
in the foreign state and determines whether the reasons for the designation persist. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(b)(3); see also Raymond Audain, Not Yet Forgiven for Being Black: Haiti’s TPS, LDF, and
the Protean Struggle for Racial Justice, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 430 (2019); Pulling Back the
Curtain-Analysis of New Government Data on Temporary Protected Status, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR.

2021]

Systemic Racism & Immigration Detention

1151

In November 2017, the Trump Administration terminated TPS for
Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador.138 TPS holders facing
termination sued contending that the Administration’s decisions to
terminate TPS programs were motivated by racial animus and violated the
Equal Protection Clause.139 At least three lower courts have applied the
Arlington factors, which include determination of: whether the impact was
disparate; whether there was an unusual sequence of events leading up to
the decision; and whether there was presidential animus against the
impacted groups, “non-white, non-European aliens,” or statements by
other relevant officials.140 These cases, and their review in district and
appellate courts, provide some insight into how courts could assess a
challenge to immigration jails at the southern border.141
Pursuant to Arlington, a potential indicator of bias is when a decision
charged with being discriminatory does not seem to follow the established
criteria.142 In Saget v. Trump, the United States District Court for the

NETWORK, INC. (Apr. 9, 2021), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/humanitarian-relief/temporaryprotected-status-and-deferred-enforced-departure/pulling [https://perma.cc/EJ9Q-3SAH].
138. Press Release, Kirstjen M. Nielson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary of
Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielson Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El
Salvador (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/01/08/secretary-homeland-security-kirstjenm-nielsen-announcement-temporary-protected [https://perma.cc/5WGS-QQ34]; JILL H. WILSON,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS AND DEFERRED ENFORCED
DEPARTURE 5 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WYJ-AE8V];
Saget v. Trump: Unlawful Termination of TPS for Haitians, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L
LAWS. GUILD (2018), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/our_lit/impact/2018_15Mar_saget
-v-trump.html [https://perma.cc/88GV-NMZE] (“The Administration announced that TPS for Haitian
nationals will expire on July 22, 2019, endangering the lives of over 50,000 Haitians and their 27,000
U.S. citizen children.”); Nicole Acevedo, Trump’s Timing for Ending TPS Immigrant Protections Was
Tied to 2020 Race, Senate Democrats Say, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/latino/trump-s-timing-ending-tps-immigrant-protections-was-tied-2020-n1078751 [https://
perma.cc/REE6-QT4S].
139. For a list of pending lawsuits, see Challenges to TPS and DED Terminations and Other
TPS-Related Litigation, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. (Jan. 5, 2021), https://clinic
legal.org/resources/humanitarian-relief/temporary-protected-status-and-deferred-enforceddeparture/challenges [https://perma.cc/GU9E-24WR].
140. See, e.g., Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Defendants do
not deny that President Trump’s alleged statements evidence racial animus; rather, they argue the
President’s animus is irrelevant because the Secretary of Homeland Security, not the President,
terminated TPS for Sudan, Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.”); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
141. Simon Romero, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Manny Fernandez, Daniel Borunda, Aaron Montes
& Caitlin Dickerson, Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant Detention Center in Clint, Tex.,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-borderpatrol-clint.html [https://perma.cc/4NR7-24HA].
142. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977)).
But see Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 899 (9th Cir. 2020). Yet, when assessing similar facts in a
separate case challenging the TPS terminations, the Ninth Circuit, interpreted that same politicized
history of the decision-making process as appropriate, even if politically motivated to emphasize a
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Eastern District of New York applied an expansive interpretation and
review of the record when considering and affirming an equal protection
challenge to the Trump Administration’s termination of TPS for
Haitians.143 The court considered both disparate impact144 and historical
background.145 In finding that the trajectory to termination of TPS was
indicative of discriminatory intent, the court considered evidence that the
decision was “political”—or contrary to the established criteria for the
relevant decision-making process.146 Specifically, Administration officials
looked for reasons to terminate TPS for Haitians—one said “[b]e
creative”147—and the White House encouraged DHS “to ignore statutory
guidelines, contort data, and disregard objective reason to reach a
predetermined decision to terminate TPS to reduce presence of non-white
immigrants in the country.”148 Rather than objectively considering
whether country conditions in Haiti warranted termination, the Saget court
used the evidentiary record to depart from the established criteria for
making such a decision and concluded the decision was motivated by
discrimination.149 The government appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals where the case is pending at the time of writing.150
In a separate district court case concerning TPS terminations, the
court similarly relied on evidence to establish that the series of events
leading up to the termination was marred by irregularity, thus suggesting
“a pre-determined outcome not based on an objective assessment.”151 The
district court applied the Arlington factors, considered the “‘specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision’” and the
different set of guiding principles, preference for a “merit-based” system, in making immigration
decisions.
143. Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
144. “[I]t is axiomatic the decision to terminate TPS for Haitians impacts one race, namely nonwhite Haitians, more than another.” Id. at 367.
145. See id. (“[T]he Court should consider additional factor, including: ‘[t]he historical
background of the decision . . . , particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes,’ ‘[s]ubstantive departures’ . . . and the ‘administrative history . . . , especially where there
are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body[.]’” (first and last bracket
added) (omissions in original) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 372 (“[T]he sequence of events leading up to the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS
was a stark departure from ordinary procedure, suggestive of a pre-determined outcome not anchored
in an objective assessment, but instead a politically motivated agenda.”).
148. Id. at 369.
149. See id. at 302–03, 368.
150. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Saget v. Trump, No. 19-1685 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2019).
151. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 887 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[G]iven the record evidence of, ‘after
receiving Decision Memos from career DHS employees, higher-level DHS employees—i.e., the
political appointees—‘repackaging’ the memos in order to get to the President/White House’s desired
result of terminating TPS.’” (citations omitted)) vacating and remanding Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F.
Supp. 3d 1075, 1101 (N.D. Cal 2018).
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“‘[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,’”152 and determined
that there was circumstantial evidence that race was a motivating factor on
the basis of disparate impact.153
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Ramos declined to apply the lower
standard of rational basis review as employed by the Trump v. Hawaii
Court, but reversed the district court’s equal protection ruling.154 The
Ramos court relied on the Regents Court’s rationale155 and found that the
plaintiffs did not present “serious questions” on the merits of their claim
that the DHS Secretary’s TPS terminations were improperly influenced by
the President’s “animus against non-white, non-European immigrants.”156
The Ninth Circuit found that TPS terminations would not necessarily
“bear more heavily on ‘non-white, non-European’ countries” where the
Trump Administration extended TPS designations for other “non-white”
countries.157 However, it is illogical to contend that disparate impact
requires all TPS holders be threatened with revocation. All of those facing
the threat of losing TPS were immigrants of color, even if not all TPS
holders would lose status. The Ninth Circuit’s framing of the question of
disparate impact was illogical and contrary to the purposes of deterring or
eliminating the harmful role of race.
With respect to the nature of the decision to terminate, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the evidence that connected the President’s alleged
discriminatory intent to the specific TPS terminations.158 This included
evidence that the President personally sought to influence the TPS
terminations and that Trump Administration officials engaged in the TPS
decision-making were themselves motivated by animus against “nonwhite, non-European” countries.159
152. Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1101 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977)).
153. “TPS terminations clearly bears more heavily on non-white, non-European individuals,”
indicative of disparate impact. Id.
154. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 896 (finding the facts to align with Regents (DACA rescission) more
than Trump v. Hawaii (noncitizens seeking admission to the US)).
155. Id. at 896 (reasoning that “the executive’s administration of the TPS program, which
provides widescale, nationality-based humanitarian harbor for foreign citizens, also involves foreign
policy and national security implications, albeit to a lesser extent than the executive order suspending
the entry of foreign nationals in Trump v. Hawaii” and stating that it is the “fundamental authority of
the executive branch to manage our nation’s foreign policy and national security affairs without
judicial interference”).
156. Id. at 897.
157. Id. at 898; see Extension of South Sudan for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg.
44,205 (Sept. 21, 2017); Extension of the Designation of Syria for Temporary Protected Status, 83
Fed. Reg. 9329 (Mar. 5, 2018); Extension of the Designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,307 (Aug. 14, 2018); Extension of Designation of Somalia for Temporary
Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,695 (Aug. 27, 2018).
158. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 897.
159. Id. at 897–98.
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The Ninth Circuit faulted the district court for allegedly making a
leap “by relying on what appears to be a ‘cat’s paw’ theory of liability—
wherein the discriminatory motive of one governmental actor may be
coupled with the act of another to impose liability on the government.”160
The court suggested that that theory of liability could not lie in
“governmental decisions in the foreign policy and national security
realm,” implicitly referring to plenary power.161 The Ninth Circuit
disregarded the circumstantial evidence to purport that “these statements
occurred primarily in contexts removed from and unrelated to TPS policy
or decisions.”162
Perhaps most tellingly, the Ramos court found the historical
background of the decision to terminate TPS, even if predetermined, did
not show racial animus.163 It instead concluded, paradoxically, “the record
indicates that any desire to terminate TPS was motivated by the
administration’s immigration policy, with its emphasis on a ‘merit-based
entry’ system, its focus on America’s economic and national security
interests, and its view on the limitations of TPS and the program’s seeming
overextension by prior administrations.”164
What has been described as a “merit-based” immigration policy
could be described as a thinly veiled white nationalist agenda.165 Rose
Cuison Villazor and Kevin Johnson explain that the “immigration policies
that the Trump Administration has adopted or seeks to deploy reveal the
160. Id. (“The mere fact that the White House exerted pressure on the Secretaries’ TPS decisions
does not in itself support the conclusion that the President’s alleged racial animus was a motivating
factor in the TPS decisions.”).
161. Id. at 897.
162. Id. at 898 (noting that the “‘President’s critical statements about Latinos,’ which were
‘remote in time and made in unrelated contexts . . . do not qualify as “contemporary statements”
probative of the decision at issue’” (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (plurality opinion))); id. (“Here, the only ‘contemporary statement’ might
be the President’s comments at the January 11, 2018[,] meeting with lawmakers, during which TPS
terminations were discussed; however, the influence of these remarks on the actual decisions to
terminate TPS is belied by the fact that the meeting occurred three days after the TPS termination
notices for Haiti and El Salvador issued. Without evidence that the President’s statements played any
role in the TPS decision-making process, the statements alone do not demonstrate that the President’s
purported racial animus was a motivating factor for the TPS terminations.”); see Mendiola-Martinez
v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1261 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “offensive quotes about Mexican
nationals attributed to Sherriff Arpaio” that did “not mention” the policy in question did not “lead to
any inference” that the policy “was promulgated to discriminate against Mexican nationals”).
163. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 898–99.
164. Id. at 899 (emphasis added); see also id. at 898 (“[T]he historical background of the TPS
terminations” did not reveal “a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” (emphasis
added)).
165. See generally Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 120; Villazor & Johnson, supra note 120, at
593 (the Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment (RAISE) Act “would change the
racial make-up of the entering immigrant population through creation of a ‘merit’-based ‘points’
system”).
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[E]xecutive [B]ranch’s war on immigration diversity in both admissions
and deportations.”166 Calls for a merit-based system are one manifestation
of anti-diversity, equality-oriented immigration policies. The family
unification policies adopted after the end of the national origins quota
system167 resulted in more racial diversity, and a merit-based system is
calculated to reverse that trajectory.168 The national origin quotas did not
restrict migration from the Western Hemisphere but were nearly a
complete ban in migration from the African continent and southeast Asia.
They were based on census data and heavily influenced by eugenics.169
Instead of quotas, migration from Mexico was controlled via enforcement
actions and tacit consent to unauthorized migration to meet labor needs.
The 1965 reforms were intended to convey a departure from more overtly
national origin and race-based preferences.
The Trump Administration’s immigration agenda begged the
question: where does express racism or discriminatory intent cross the line
and become systemic racism? The Trump Administration’s immigration
agenda was both rhetorically and strategically designed to create an
immigration policy, without the consent of Congress, that favored those
considered “white” or who had European national origins.170 Not
attempting to hide his preferences or motivation, President Trump
carelessly and regularly made public remarks like, “[W]e should have
more people from Norway.”171 As was indicative of his presidency, many

166. Villazor & Johnson, supra note 120, at 578.
167. See Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952); Immigration and Nationality
Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1503 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
168. Kevin R. Johnson, Proposition 187 and Its Political Aftermath: Lessons for U.S.
Immigration Politics After Trump, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1859, 1891 (2020) (“Family reunification
policies have contributed significantly to the current racial demographics of immigration in the United
States, which includes many people of color from the developing world.”).
169. See James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J. Tichenor, Immigrants, Markets, and
Rights: The United States as an Emerging Migration State, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 21 (2008)
(explaining that immigration law’s national origins quota system enacted during the 1920s “was
deeply informed by a new scientific theory—eugenics—that reinvigorated old distinctions between
desirable and unworthy immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion,” explaining that the
“new quota system was explicitly planned to favor northern and western European immigrants, and to
exclude Asians, Africans, as well as southern and eastern Europeans”); NGAI, supra note 15, at 3;
Johnson, supra note 16, at 1115–16 (explaining the connection between quotas and racialized
exclusion, and the evolution “into more subtle forms of exclusion”). See generally Rachel Silber, Note,
Eugenics, Family, and Immigration Law in the 1920’s, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 859 (1997) (arguing
eugenics was at the center of immigration policy in the early twentieth century).
170. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 1113.
171. Nurith Aizenman, Trump Wishes We Had More Immigrants from Norway. Turns Out We
Once Did, NPR (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/01/12/577673191
/trump-wishes-we-had-more-immigrants-from-norway-turns-out-we-once-did [https://perma.cc/3VC
Y-CECK].
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believed that he gave voice to the “politically incorrect” but genuinely held
perspectives of a segment of the population.172
If the Ramos court viewed the TPS termination in connection with
the Trump Administration’s “merit-based” immigration agenda, it may
have been clearer that the TPS termination was, as the district court found,
evidence of discriminatory intent. Instead, the court effectively inverted
the meaning behind the merit-based system cleansing the TPS decision of
its background and implicit, yet racial, motivation.
The decisions in Trump v. Hawaii, Regents, and Ramos show both
the potential of “historical” circumstantial evidence and the limitations of
the current intent analysis; the courts’ reasoning implies a world where
disparate impact is mere coincidence. The courts’ requirement of a certain
kind of express bias, even if not on the face of the law or government
action, effectively converts the intent doctrine into a requirement for
express discrimination—in effect, an overt confession. By requiring an
express intention to discriminate, the evidentiary burden becomes nearly
identical to that of intentional discrimination cases.
Jennifer Chacón writes that Chief Justice Roberts’ “see no evil”
approach to equal protection implicit bias challenges “ignore[s] all the
ways that powerful majoritarian forces seek to use racial constructs to
enhance white supremacy,” which fails to stop, and even facilitates,
discrimination.173 This blindness is a matter of individual perception and
highlights the challenge of finding discriminatory intent in a judicial
system tainted by its origins in a neocolonial legal order.174
It is possible, however, that lower court rulings could carve a path
for revision of the narrow view of the Arlington factors—including taking
a more expansive view of the evidentiary record and attempting to grapple
with history to find discriminatory intent. However, until and unless the
Court recognizes the constitutional due process and habeas rights of
immigrants at the border, equality-based claims will never be heard at
all.175
172. Dan Sweeney, Donald Trump Just Saying What People Are Thinking – Even Liberals,
SUNSENTINEL (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/sfl-donald-trump-justsaying-what-people-are-thinking-even-liberals-20160215-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/Z3BZ8H7A]; Yascha Mounk, Americans Strongly Dislike PC Culture, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/large-majorities-dislike-politicalcorrectness/572581/ [https://perma.cc/MJV5-B8C9]. Stephen Miller, an aid to the President and
highly influential in his immigration policy, has expressed anti-immigrant views favoring white
supremacism. See Katie Rogers & Jason DeParle, The White Nationalist Websites Cited by Stephen
Miller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/politics/stephen-millerwhite-nationalism.html [https://perma.cc/PHV8-8K9U].
173. Chacón, supra note 99, at 254.
174. See infra Part IV.
175. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1961 (2020).
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III. DOES THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL IMMIGRATION STATUTE
AUTHORIZING DETENTION VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION?
If the Supreme Court did not invoke plenary power and instead
engaged in an expansive view of the evidentiary record, it could find that
a facially neutral immigration statute discretionarily authorizing
imprisonment of noncitizens at the southern border violates equal
protection.176 The facially neutral statute, INA § 235(b)(1)(A), authorizes
discretionary detention or imprisonment of immigrants at the southern
border between the United States and Mexico. While advocates have
brought due process (and conditions of confinement) challenges,
INA § 235(b)(1)(A) has not been challenged as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. This Part of the Article introduces and discusses a
hypothetical claim from the standpoint of the existing framework—the
Arlington factors.177 The analysis underscores the way in which plenary
power is a significant obstacle to meaningful review by undermining full
consideration of the evidentiary record, including evidence of relevant
historical bias. It also allows for a critique of the limitations of Arlington
and the potential of an effects-based invalidation approach to disparate
impact claims.
A. Justiciability—Plenary Power
In a challenge to the immigration detention statute,
INA § 235(b)(1)(A), the role of plenary power and the standard of review
would potentially be outcome determinative. The Court would have to
decide if plenary power allowed any review at all because an immigration
law is in question.178 If the Court determined that the claim was justiciable,
it would then consider which level of scrutiny applied—merely rational

176. The Immigration and Nationality Act uses the term “detention” because immigration law is
civil; therefore, imprisonment is not considered punishment and happens in “detention” centers rather
than prison. However, because detention is effectively experienced as punishment, and prisons and
jails serve as detention centers, I use the terms “prison,” “imprisonment,” or “incarceration.” See, e.g.,
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, The Perverse Logic of Immigration Detention: Unraveling the
Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants Based on Markers of Race and Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 353, 364 (2012) (“‘They call immigration detention civil confinement, but prison is prison
no matter what label you use[.]’” (citation omitted)).
177. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). See
generally Eyer, supra note 47. This analysis will necessarily not be as complete as briefing would be
in such a case and is intended to demonstrate the challenges with the equal protection intent doctrine
in immigration law.
178. See supra Part III.
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basis review,179 as was the case in Trump v. Hawaii,180 or a more thorough
application of the Arlington factors, as indicated in Regents.181
The Trump v. Hawaii Court reasoned that a narrow standard of
review applied because, pursuant to Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Executive
had provided a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for its decision
and national security justifications gave rise to the need for a less searching
review.182 However, the Trump v. Hawaii Court chose to engage in an
unconventional application of Mandel,183 effectively applying rational
basis review to look slightly beyond the apparent facial neutrality of the
order and at extrinsic evidence.184
Whether the noncitizen is already in the United States is also relevant
to the Court’s determination of the level of review. The TPS holders and
DACA recipients were considered to have a vested interest in remaining
because they were already in the United States. Plenary power was less
robust when the noncitizens were already in the country; thus, the Court
gave less deference to the Executive’s attempted termination as compared
to foreign nationals abroad, like those excluded by the Travel Ban in
Trump v. Hawaii.185 The Court generally gives foreign nationals lawfully
present in the United States greater constitutional protection than it does
to those outside it.186
One could make the argument that while the noncitizen challengers
of the immigration detention statute may not uniformly have extensive ties
to the United States, because they have just arrived, their lack of presence
is a legal fiction.187 The Mexican and Central American immigrants who
179. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (“For our purposes today, we
assume that we may look behind the face of the Proclamation [(travel ban)] to the extent of applying
rational basis review. That standard of review considers whether the entry policy is plausibly related
to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country and improve vetting processes.”).
180. See, e.g., id. at 2419–20 (“‘Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility’
of the President ‘to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest
caution,’ and our inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly constrained.” quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976))).
181. See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
182. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2402 (finding that the Executive’s “facially legitimate and
bona fide” reason was sufficient to support the government’s denial of admission to a Belgian
journalist and Marxist (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1972))).
183. Id. at 2420. Justice Sotomayor and Ginsburg’s dissent, however, asserted that the cases the
plurality relied on in limiting judicial review did not apply if the Trump policy was contextualized
within the scope of a broader interpretation of the circumstances of discriminatory intent. Id. at 2440–
41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2420 (majority opinion).
185. See, e.g., id.
186. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (collecting cases); see also Saget v.
Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
187. See, e.g., Eunice Lee, The End of Entry Fiction, 99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021); see also César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57
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could challenge the statute are here in immigration jails.188 In addition,
their claims for humanitarian protection could elevate the recognition of
their presence, justifying greater deference to their constitutional claims
and less deference to the government’s exercise of discretionary authority
to detain them. If the government contended that they presented a security
threat justifying detention as deterrence,189 the Court could require proof
of the threat.190 Further, while their constitutional rights are low because
of their presence at the threshold of entry, and plenary power is at its peak,
the Court could consider that those factors are outweighed by the
pretextual claim of national security.191
If INA § 235 were to be challenged on the basis of having a
disproportionate impact on Latinx persons, or those of Mexican, Central
American, and African descent, the Court would ask whether (1) Congress
had an invidious intent to discriminate, (2) DHS had an invidious intent to
discriminate when it decided to exercise its discretion to detain, or (3) if
both Congress and DHS had invidious intent to discriminate. If the Court
found discriminatory intent, the burden would shift to the government, and
the Court would consider whether there was an alternative,
nondiscriminatory purpose for INA § 235 that might justify the law. The
detailed analysis would likely follow the Arlington factors.
The Arlington factors include (1) the “historical background of the
decision, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes”; (2) departures from normal procedures; (3)
HOW. L.J. 869, 876 (2014) (discussing the “entry fiction” which denies “constitutional due process
protections to detained individuals on the basis that they were not in fact present in the United States”).
188. They may also have ties to the United States and may have been living here for an extended
period and left to visit family.
189. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 191 (D.D.C. 2015) (issuing a preliminary injunction
“[i]n light of the Court’s conclusion that DHS’s current policy of considering deterrence is likely
unlawful, and that the policy causes irreparable harm to mothers and children seeking asylum, the
Court finds that these last two factors favor Plaintiffs as well”).
190. See Dora Schriro, Women and Children First: An Inside Look at the Challenges to
Reforming Family Detention in the United States, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
ACADEMICS, ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS 28 (Michael J. Flynn & Matthew B. Flynn eds., 2017);
see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 48 (2010)
(“[E]xisting policies and practices almost certainly have caused overdetention: detention of individuals
who pose no actual flight risk or danger to public safety or are held under overly restrictive
circumstances.”); Mitzi Marquez-Avila, Comment, No More Hieleras: Doe v. Kelly’s Fight for
Constitutional Rights at the Border, 66 UCLA L. REV. 818, 832 (2019) (“Hand in hand with the
punitive immigration detention conditions is the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in the United
States that is easily seen in political rhetoric, the characterization of ‘immigration law as a weapon in
the war on terror,’ and the view that immigrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border are a threat to
national security.” (citations omitted)).
191. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Taking all the relevant evidence together, a reasonable observer would conclude that the
Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted
national-security justifications.”).
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legislative and administrative history; (4) contemporary statements by
members of the decision-making body; and (5) a specific series of events
leading up to the challenged action.192 The Court will focus on disparate
impact and the unusual history of the statute because that is often the most
contentious component of the analysis.193
B. Disparate Impact on Central American and Mexican Asylum Seekers
The large percent of Central American and Mexican nationals in
immigration detention at the southern border demonstrates the disparate
impact of INA § 235(b)(1)(A). As more families from the Central
American countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (the
Northern Triangle) have attempted to request humanitarian relief at the
southern border, the discretionary policy to detain has become more
consistently punitive.194 Punitiveness may be relevant both to disparate
impact and the unusual history of enforcement of the law.
The Executive Office of Immigration Review’s data suggests that
Central Americans are disproportionately subjected to family detention at
the United States–Mexico border. Eighty percent of individuals in family
detention proceedings over a fifteen year study period from 2001–2016
were Central Americans from El Salvador (34%), Honduras (27%), and
Guatemala (19%).195 The remaining twenty-one percent were from
Mexico (6%), China (2%), Iraq (1%), Colombia (1%), and twenty-four
other countries (10%).196 By 2016, ninety-four percent of families detained
were from the Northern Triangle,197 while the proportion of detained
families from other countries declined significantly.198
192. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
193. Statements by lawmakers are not being considered here because the Trump regime was an
aberration and express statements of bias by lawmakers are rare, although that factor deserves separate
consideration.
194. See Lee, supra note 187, at 634 (explaining that “[u]nder policies of the outgoing Trump
Administration, the aims of detention and removal grew more punitive by executive design” and
examining the lack of appropriate constitutional protection with respect to bor der entry issues in the
context of intentionally punitive immigration policy “combined with virtually unrestricted
enforcement authority by lower officials”); Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining
Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 792, 829–30
(2018) (compiling data concerning the immigration court process as it pertains to detained asylum
seekers and referencing “punitive conditions” in family detention facilities) (citing ELEANOR ACER &
JESSICA CHICCO, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING
PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 45 (2009), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/
pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QL-FUTS] (“For arriving
asylum seekers in particular, many expressed surprise at being handcuffed, imprisoned and treated
like criminals . . . .”)).
195. Id. at 829.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Along with that shift in the composition of border arrivals, the Trump
Administration increased border apprehensions; monthly reports in early
2019 indicated a 434% increase in apprehensions compared to previous
years.199 The shift in migration patterns corresponded with the
Administration’s increase in apprehensions and detentions of border
arrivals.200 The ethnic or racial composition of those being imprisoned
suggests that race is relevant to immigration imprisonment practices at the
border.201
In Regents, the Roberts plurality suggested that the correlation
between race and the Administration’s DACA decision was not proof of
discriminatory intent because more Mexican nationals would be injured
by the rescission of DACA than other groups because a majority of DACA
holders were Mexican nationals.202 Similarly, a disproportionate number
of Mexicans and Central Americans are fleeing and arriving at the United
States’ southern border and thus disproportionately detained.203 However,
the Roberts plurality’s perspective discounts discriminatory motivation.
The decision to detain pursuant to INA § 235(b)(1)(A) may only apply to
this population precisely because they are from Mexico and Central
America. It is not necessary to compare racial groups to identify disparate
impact.204

199. Hamilton-Jiang, supra note 6, at 59 (citing Kristen Bialik, Border Apprehensions Increased
in 2018 - Especially for Migrant Families, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2019/01/16/border-apprehensions-of-migrant-families-have-risensubstantially-so-far-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/7JS5-QNP9]; see also Robert Moore, Border Patrol
Apprehensions Are at an 11-Year High. Most Are Families and Children, TEX. MONTHLY (Mar. 5,
2019), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/border-patrol-apprehensions-are-at-an-11-year-highmost-are-families-and-children/ [https://perma.cc/ENU4-WGGW].
200. Robert Moore & Abigail Haslohner, Trump Administration Working to Close Immigration
‘Loopholes’—But Border is Still a Crisis, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-says-it-is-closing-immigrationloopholes-but-border-is-still-a-crisis/2019/10/29/99bbc9ac-fa62-11e9-ac8c-8eced29ca6ef_story.html
[https://perma.cc/VD63-WEN5].
201. Hamilton-Jiang, supra note 6, at 59–60.
202. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing that, because Latinxs make up a large share of the unauthorized alien
population, one would expect them to make up an outsized share of recipients of any cross-cutting
immigration relief program).
203. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 194, at 829–30; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-36, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ARRESTS, DETENTIONS, AND
REMOVALS, AND ISSUES RELATED TO SELECTED POPULATIONS 14–16 (2019),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/706604.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UW8-SSP3]; Southwest Land Border
Encounters, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
southwest-land-border-encounters [https://perma.cc/3ZKW-PPMM].
204. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–71 (1977)
(focusing on discriminatory purpose and distinguishing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
which found that racially disproportionate impact was not sufficient to establish racial discrimination).
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Whether in connection with the DACA rescission or an immigration
detention statute, the relevant question in determining discriminatory
impact is whether the choice to implement such a policy has a disparate
impact, not whether one group is disadvantaged more than another. A law
does not need to be applied to one group in a way that is different than
another to meet the disparate impact element. It only needs to apply to one
group: the group that is experiencing disparate impact. Alternatively, a law
can fall heavily on a protected class and an unprotected class and still be
discriminatory.
Based on this hypothetical where the law is facially neutral but
noncitizens imprisoned pursuant to it are disproportionately of Mexican or
Central American descent, equal protection challengers could demonstrate
disparate impact because more Central American and Mexican nationals
are detained than any other group. Even if they had to show that the law
was not neutrally applied, they would be able to because of the
discretionary decision to detain all persons at the southern border.
C. Background and History of INA § 235(b)(1)(A) and the Role of Race
in Immigration Law
The role of race in, and particularly enforcement of, immigration law
is all encompassing and provides a background for understanding the
relationship between race and immigration prisons at the southern border.
This history is relevant in assessing discriminatory intent, particularly in
an equal protection challenge to immigration prisons at the border.205
The historical treatment of Mexican and Central American nationals
at the border could be considered relevant to the invidious intent
determination.206 The Arlington Court provided little explanation of its
“historical background” factor;207 it only instructed that, “The historical
background of the decision is one evidentiary source [of discriminatory
intent], particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes.”208 The Court could, and should, expansively interpret
the “historical background of the decision.”209 With the Court’s sole
instruction in mind, the history paints a picture of INA § 235(b)(1)(A) as
205. See id. at 267; see also supra Section II.B.
206. See, e.g., RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., THE MYTH OF
CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND
FOREIGN-BORN MEN 3 (2007); see also BRIAN N. FRY, NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION: REGULATING
THE AMERICAN DREAM 2 (2006); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1963).
207. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 267.
208. Id.
209. Id. (“[H]istorical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.”).
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both unusual and usual to the extent that it reinforces the invidious role of
race in immigration enforcement at the southern border.
Immigration law’s role in the manufacturing of race has been
pernicious and persistent in American culture and political and legal
institutions.210 The 1924 National Origins Act211 and the 1952 Immigration
and Nationality Act212 are both built on a history of racializing national
origin exclusion.213 The national origin quotas, which established a
numerical maximum of immigrants per country, institutionalized
discrimination in immigrant admissions and were considered in conflict
with equality principles at the time.214 In 1965, Congress repealed national
origin quotas on the heels of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting
Rights Act.215
Mexico was exempt from the quotas because of demands of
agribusiness for what became an exploitable, and particularly precarious,
class of workers.216 Anti-Mexican immigrant sentiment was codified and
executed without quotas on migration. Instead, the government opted for
enhanced policing of the southern border and rigorous enforcement of
deportation laws against Mexican nationals.217 As Ingrid Eagly writes, the
enforcement of criminal laws to prosecute illegal entry and reentry against
Mexican border crossers, particularly in the 1950s, also contributed to
criminalization and racialization of Mexican immigrants and persons of
210. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 298 (2009) (arguing that “English-Only movements are a present-day form of
lynching for Latinos”). As evidenced throughout this Article, these movements arise out of the
discriminatory culture of U.S. immigration law.
211. Immigration (National Origins) Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 2, 43 Stat. 153.
212. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 169-70 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
213. The process of expressing preference or disfavor based on national origin was part of the
way in which immigration law served to manufacture the construct of race. See NGAI, supra note 15,
at 26, 33–34 (describing national origin quotas and race); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other
Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1361, 1394 (2011) (“By barring certain racial groups, Congress sought to create and reify a White
nation through immigration law.”)
214. Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in
the Twenty-First Century, 8 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 42, 81 (1995) (arguing that these quotas had
institutionalized discrimination in admissions of immigrants into the United States and effectively
limited immigration of people of color to this nation).
215. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911, 911–12 (amending the
INA); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 to 1973bb-1); see also NGAI, supra
note 15, at 227–28 (discussing reformation of National Origin Quotas).
216. NGAI, supra note 15, at 54.
217. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, The New Latino Underclass: Immigration Enforcement as
Race-Making Institution 3–5 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://inequality.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/media/_media/working_papers/massey_new-latino-underclass.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DLD7-62YJ].
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Mexican descent.218 These policies manipulated public perception of
Mexican nationals in the United States, sending a message that all were
undocumented and inferior.219 Immigration law has uniquely impacted
Salvadorans and Guatemalans seeking asylum in the United States,
particularly in the 1980s during civil wars in those countries.220 Biased
adjudication of asylum claims resulted in a consent decree.221
Racialized border enforcement and exclusion is not only embedded
in United States immigration history but continues to shape migration and
demographics. The Haitian asylum seekers interdicted at sea in the 1980s
are indicative of this problem.222 Critics alleged that the Haitian
interdictions were motivated by race, on the basis of African ancestry or
heritage, but effectuated via the proxy of alienage and immigration
status.223 The Haitian interdictions were never invalidated on equal
protection grounds because in Jean v. Nelson the Eleventh Circuit stated
that “excludable aliens” were not entitled to equal protection under the
Fifth Amendment.224 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,225 an alienage case, where the Court had found an equal
218. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2010).
219. See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 15, at 89.
220. See M. Kathleen Dingeman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Deportation Experiences: The
Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation Experiences: Encountering Stereotypes in Southern
California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 363, 387–88 (2010) (describing the significance
of the civil war in El Salvador from 1980 to 1992 that led to an exodus to flee “political repression,
armed conflict, and economic disruptions” but where the US government had financially and militarily
supported the right-wing government and engaged in “systematic denial of refugee status and political
asylum to Salvadoran migrants” and subsequently experienced poor or hostile reception in the United
States).
221. See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (Stipulated
Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement) (ordering settlement decree in national classaction regarding biased adjudication of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applications and ordering
reconsideration of applications by approximately 250,000 class members).
222. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992); see Ingrid Eagly and Steven
Shafer, The Institutional Hearing Program: A Study of Prison-Based Immigration Courts in the United
States, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 788 (2020) (discussing this period, including the legacy INS racialized
border enforcement against Cubans at that time).
223. Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States’
Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 710 (1993).
224. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1988); see Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien
Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1940 (1996)
(reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION
DISASTER (1995)); Geoffrey Heeren, Distancing Refugees, 97 DENV. L. REV. 761 (2020). But note
that a district and circuit court upheld equal protection claims on the grounds that the “Haitian
Program” violated the plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process rights. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 532 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Lennox, supra note 223, at 715 n.222 (“[W]e do not
address the Equal Protection contentions any more than to observe that we do not approve the
sweeping conclusions of the district court.” (quoting Smith, 676 F.2d at 1041)).
225. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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protection violation.226 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that while the Yick
Wo Court, for the purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
“recognized that aliens are ‘persons’ . . . and ‘ . . . entitled to the same
constitutional protections afforded all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States,’ . . . the decision to parole or detain an
excludable alien” is distinguishable.227 Instead, the circuit court deemed
the alienage decision as “an integral part of the admissions process
and . . . the grant of discretionary authority to the Attorney General under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) permits the Executive to discriminate on the
basis of national origin in making parole decisions.”228 In other words, the
circuit court rationalized national origin discrimination on the basis of the
federal government’s plenary power, or complete authority, over
immigration law.
Immigration status is analogous to national origin, yet courts fail to
apply the same analysis. This is in part because immigration law is written
in nonracial language that inhibits “inquiries into legislative intent” in
spite of having “a disproportionate impact” along lines of race.229 Where
national origin, like immigration status, serves as a proxy for race, and the
discrimination is not in the language of the statute, it remains difficult to
identify national origin as an equal protection violation.230
1. Brief History of Immigration Incarceration Pursuant to INA § 235 and
Differential Treatment of the United States-Mexico and United StatesCanada Borders
The use of immigration imprisonment is not new, nor is its
relationship to race. Congress first introduced mandatory detention into

226. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 962–63 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
227. Id. at 963 (internal citations omitted).
228. Id.
229. Motomura, supra note 224, at 1951. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on
Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance
and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995) (noting the difficulties in proving a
discriminatory intent of the drafters of California Proposition 187). The limits of an intent-based Equal
Protection doctrine seem particularly evident in the immigration field. See generally Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987). But cf. Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id,
the Ego, and the Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2280 (2001)
(proposing that the challenge is even deeper because Lawrence’s proposal “only captured only a partial
truth about race and racism. Ideal factors—thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental
categories—only partially explain how race and racism work. Material factors—socioeconomic
competition, immigration pressures, the search for profits, changes in the labor pool, nativism—
account for even more”).
230. Although in Jean the statute was also neutral with respect to national origin. See Jean, 727
F.2d at 963.
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immigration enforcement in 1988.231 The 1988 legislation, however, was
not designed to deter migration because it did not target noncitizens
seeking entry into the United States.232 INA § 235 was part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
which reformed certain aspects of immigration policy and was responsible
for criminalizing immigration law.233
It has not always been true that the United States imprisoned tens of
thousands of immigrants a day, nor was it inevitable234 The 1980’s “War
on Drugs,” was partially responsible for stimulating the growth of
immigration prisons when the Executive and Legislative Branches
expanded both authority to detain and to set capacity.235 Immigration
detention was “an outgrowth of the increasingly harsh penal norms gaining
popularity during that period.”236 The shift towards penalty in immigration
enforcement “gained popularity at roughly the same time that penal
incarceration was growing exponentially.”237 Punishing migration
coincided with an influx of Haitian and Black refugees in the 1980s.238 Use
231. Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 147 (2013) (“Congress passed the first mandatory immigration detention law,
requiring the detention of a specified class of noncitizens and depriving federal immigration officials
of the authority to release those individuals on bond pending their removal proceedings.”); see also
Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States,
10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 584 (1998) (warning, two years after enactment of IIRIRA, of the border as
the new criminal justice frontier and noticing that imprisonment, distributed “on the basis of race or
nationality” might pose a constitutional problem).
232. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
233. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1299, 1344 (2011) (“While there have been a number of significant events marking the increased
criminalization of immigration law, all pale in comparison to the 1996 passage of the [IIRIRA].”).
234. See Philip L. Torrey, Immigration Detention’s Unfounded Bed Mandate, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 15-04, 1 (Apr. 2015) (“The United States immigration detention system is largely driven
by a congressional directive that requires the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
maintain 34,000 beds in immigration detention at all times.”); see also Abolishing Immigration
Prisons, supra note 23, at 248.
235. García Hernández, supra note 23, at 248; see also Eagly & Shafer, supra note 222, at 792,
798–99 (characterizing the drive to control border entry and even asylum claims as another rationale
for the emergence of the use of prisons to detain migrants).
236. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1372 (2014).
237. Id. at 1375.
238. Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, in 13
IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 74, 79 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1990) (“The legal fiction” of an immigrant
seeking asylum but not having made an entry for the purposes exercising due process rights arose out
of the Haitian arrivals in the 1970s - the “first substantial group of black refugees.” This “denial of a
hearing was the result of a legal fiction that, apprehended on the shores of Miami, they were ‘outside’
the United States and thus entitled to no constitutional protections.” This prompted “[a] major civil
rights movement . . . [and] some of the most important class-action litigation in recent years
concerning due process and asylum rights.”).

2021]

Systemic Racism & Immigration Detention

1167

of mandatory detention in response to Haitian arrivals set the stage for the
current immigration carceral state.
The United States’ immigration carceral state is racially skewed in a
manner analogous to criminal incarceration rates, for similarly dubious
reasons.239 The media and politicians characterized Haitian refugees
criminals and illegal aliens, rather than refugees lawfully seeking
protection pursuant to international and federal law.240 The similarity to
racialization of other groups in prior eras, and contemporary migration is
striking, albeit not surprising. The political and popular discourse
concerning the Haitians was consistent with earlier demonizing rhetoric
that associated ethnicity or race with criminality in immigration law,
including Chinese migrants in the 19th Century, Mexican migrants before
and after the Bracero Program.241 The treatment of Mexicans and Central
Americans at the border pursuant to INA § 235(b)(1)(A) is characteristic
of this punitive and racializing response and fits within the usualness of
the role of race in immigration law.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A) was but one component of the 1996 legislation;
the statute also empowered Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to more
easily detain and rapidly and deport noncitizens who present themselves
at the border, even when requesting humanitarian protection. This is
known as expedited removal.242 Expedited removal is administrative,
meaning procedural due process does not require an immigration hearing
before a noncitizen is either detained or removed.243
239. García Hernández, supra note 23, at 288 (demonstrating the way in which racial bias in
criminal law and confinement mirrors that of immigration incarceration and, specifically, “[b]y
[disproportionately] confining migrants of color, especially Latinos, immigration imprisonment
perpetuates their subordinated status”).
240. García Hernández, supra note 236, at 1376.
241. See NGAI, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 16; Motomura, supra note 109; García
Hernández, supra note 23; Vázquez, supra note 29.
242. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, JULIET P. STUMPF & PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM, IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP 327 (9th ed. 2020) (“In 1996, Congress enacted an expedited removal procedure,
INA § 235(b)(1), to apply to ‘arriving aliens,’ if they are inadmissible under either of two grounds.
One is INA § 212(a)(6)(C), if the noncitizen has attempted to obtain admission or other immigration
benefits through fraud or misrepresentation, even in the past. The other is § 212(a)(7), if the noncitizen
lacks a valid passport, visa, or other required document. And - The same statute gives the Secretary of
Homeland Security (formerly the Attorney General) the ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ to apply
expedited removal to noncitizens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States, if they
do not ‘affirmatively show[], to the satisfaction of an immigration officer,’ that they have been
continuously present in the United States for the preceding two years. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii),
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1).” (internal citations omitted)).
243. For important scholarly commentary on the rise of deportation without judicial process, see
Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595,
611–32 (2009) (summarizing the methods, aside from removal hearings, that the government uses to
deport noncitizens); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181, 181 (2017) (documenting that “the vast majority of persons ordered removed never step
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This criminalization of migration via expedited removal arose in the
context of a long history of disparate treatment of Mexican migrants, and
of migration via the Mexican and Canadian borders, and respective
racialization specific to each port of entry. Canadian migrants were
generally racialized as white, whereas Mexican migrants were racialized
as non-white, except for a brief moment after the 1897 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo when it served certain political aims and the needs of
labor to racialize them as white.244 As a result, Canadian nationals have
generally enjoyed less restricted access to the United States compared to
Mexican nationals. For example, in the 1920s, Europeans could enter the
United States lawfully after residing in Canada for five years—an option
not available to migrants from the Mexican border.245
With the advent of Border Patrol, admission through the Mexican
border became more arduous and included invasive and degrading
processes.246 As historian Mae Ngai explained, “Racial presumptions
about Mexican laborers, not law, dictated procedures at the Mexican
border.”247 This continues to be true today, although the role of race in
shaping the law takes colorblind forms that Equal Protection cannot easily
reach. Members of the Ku Klux Klan, one of the country’s most notorious
violent racist hate groups, were formally welcomed into the enforcement
arm of the state as Border Patrol officers.248 Even today, white

foot inside a courtroom”); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of
Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 1 (2014) (“In 2013, the majority of people deported never saw
a courtroom or immigration judge.”).
244. NGAI, supra note 15, at 50. But see In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (W.D. Tex. 1897), the first
case where a Mexican citizen was considered for naturalization on an individual basis, depending on
whether he was deemed “white,” which the Court found he was. See also IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 43–44 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court’s
decision to treat some persons of Mexican descent as “white” for the purposes of granted U.S.
citizenship after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo where the US naturalized 115,000 Mexicans
(collectively) although they were not treated as “white” by within their communities depending on
socio-economic status); see also LAURA E. GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 139–41 (2007) (describing the Court’s decision as finding them not truly
white, but white enough, and contextualizing the decision within the labor shortage influenced by
Asian exclusion).
245. Id. at 66–67.
246. Id. at 68.
247. Id.
248. Id. KKK members were also known to be in local law enforcement as police officers. Robin
D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)night: Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law
Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1996); Vida B. Johnson, KKK in
the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About It, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205 (2019)
(describing an “epidemic of white supremacists in police departments and proposing prosecutors be
required to seek out information about police officers racial bias in line with the principle established
by the Supreme Court that the government must disclose any information that is favorable to the
defense”); see also, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 790 (1966) (explaining sheriffs in
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supremacists and sympathizers are employed by the United States as law
enforcement officers, members of the military, Border Patrol, and DHS.249
The laissez-faire approach to migration from the north harkens back
to the earliest immigration restrictions.250 The 1930s immigration reform
created a process called “pre-examination” that favored Canadians and
migrants of European descent.251 By 1945 the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) employed a race neutral policy, and
effectively “categorically den[ied] relief to Mexican and Caribbean
migrants.”252 The system was “profound” in its colorblind, remedy-proof
racism.253 In line with this history, enforcement of INA § 235 is drastically
different at the southern border compared to the northern border.254 These
are only some of the relevant historical components necessary to
Mississippi conspired with members of the KKK to kidnap and murder out-of-state civil rights
workers).
249. See, e.g., MICHAEL GERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT:
RACISM, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND FAR-RIGHT MILITANCY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-whitesupremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law [https://perma.cc/RHH7-E6Y9]; Greg Grandin, The Border
Patrol Has Been a Cult of Brutality Since 1924, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 12, 2019), https://the
intercept.com/2019/01/12/border-patrol-history/ [https://perma.cc/T55C-CAC9]; A.C. Thompson,
Inside the Secret Border Patrol Facebook Group Where Agents Joke About Migrant Deaths and Post
Sexist Memes, PROPUBLICA (July 1, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/secret-border-patrolfacebook-group-agents-joke-about-migrant-deaths-post-sexist-memes [https://perma.cc/9VYFHZNH].
250. NGAI, supra note 15, at 63–64 (explaining that both history and policy constructed the USMexican and US- Canadian borders differently).
251. NGAI, supra note 15, at 86–87; see also Elwin Griffith, The Road Between the Section
212(C) Waiver and Cancellation of Removal Under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality
Act—The Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 68–69 (1997) (“It was not
unusual for an alien to go to Canada and return with an immigrant visa, after living in the United States
illegally for some time.”); Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1595, 1602–03 (2005) (“The program allowed Europeans to take voluntary departure
to Canada, obtain a visa for permanent residence from the United States consul there, and then reenter
as legal immigrants. Asians did not qualify for the program, as they were categorically excluded from
immigration on grounds of racial ineligibility; while one district director tried to grant pre-examination
to Mexicans, he was stopped after 1938. . . . Between 1935 and 1959, the INS processed nearly 58,000
cases and granted approval in the vast majority of them. . . . Thus, Europeans could convert their status
from illegal aliens to lawful immigrants through pre-examination.” (reviewing NGAI, supra note 15));
ASHLEY JOHNSON BAVERY, BOOTLEGGED ALIENS: IMMIGRATION POLITICS ON AMERICA’S
NORTHERN BORDER (Univ. of Penn Press 2020).
252. NGAI, supra note 15.
253. NGAI, supra note 15, at 87.
254. Some contend that there are fewer attempts at undocumented migration from Canada
because it is a wealthier country. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order
Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 830 (2007). Cox and Posner also propose that
“American immigration law may have begun to rely more on ex post screening as it has become less
racist.” Id. at 839. However, there is evidence that immigration law remains as racist as it was in the
past but hides it better. See Peter Andreas, A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada
Lines After 9-11 (Ctr. for Comparative Immigr. Studies, Working Paper No. 77, 2003),
https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_files/wp77.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW2L-6KS2].
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contextualize whether the Court should consider INA § 235 to be marred
by discriminatory intent.255
2. Expansion of Expedited Removal and One-Direction (Darkside)
Discretion
From the standpoint of consistent and fair administration of justice,
one of the most dangerous aspects of the expedited removal statute is that
it authorizes CBP officers to use discretion, without review, to detain
noncitizens at the border. The statute does not mandate expedited removal
nor detention.256 Yet in recent years, ICE and CBP have applied this
discretionary authority in one direction: punitively, choosing expedited
removal and detention. Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia aptly named
this “darkside discretion.”257 This “darkside discretion” could also be
evidence of discriminatory intent.258
The consistently punitive exercise of discretion to prosecute, is
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent when it aligns with a
pattern of disparate impact. 259 With respect to INA § 235, the pattern has
been stark. DHS’s exercise of discretion has resulted in disparate
imprisonment of Mexican and Central Americans.260 Exercising discretion
in a punitive manner, absent evidence of a national security threat, in
combination with expansion of expedited removal, was unusual. DHS’s
use of detention pursuant to this statute, to deter these particular migrants
can be understood in the historical context of racialization, exclusion, and
exploitation of Mexicans and Central Americans.
The United States’ use of immigration imprisonment to control
borders as an expression of sovereignty261 has often disproportionately
255. Significantly more evidence of historic anti-Mexican and anti-Latinx bias in immigration
enforcement could be presented in support of this component of the Arlington analysis.
256. INA § 235.
257. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. REV.
367, 375 (2020) (arguing that instead of “humanitarian concerns,” the government “uses the tool of
discretion negatively, even in the face of a robust statute and subsequent harms”).
258. See Alia Al-Khatib & Jayesh Rathod, Equity in Contemporary Immigration Enforcement:
Defining Contributions and Countering Criminalization, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 951, 955 (2018) (“[T]he
absence of any discretion at the margins will compromise a system’s moral legitimacy.”); García
Hernández, supra note 23; García Hernández, supra note 236.
259. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
260. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” (citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
261. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11,
2004) (authorizing the DHS to place a designated class of immigrants in expedited removal
proceedings).
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burdened racialized immigrants of color. The expedited removal statute is
indicative of this means of policing migration. It was not inevitable that
increased migration from Central America and Mexico resulted in more
detention.262 However, even under prior administrations, from a policy
standpoint, immigration detention was considered an appropriate means
of deterring migration from particular regions.263
Beginning in 2004, the Executive expanded expedited removal to
noncitizens who entered without inspection. As a result, noncitizens are
stopped within 100 miles of the United States–Mexico border or the
United States–Canada border, unless they could prove that they have been
continuously present in the United States for more than fourteen days.264
By 2019, the Trump Administration, through the Secretary of Homeland
Security, expanded expedited removal “in his sole and unreviewable
discretion” to all noncitizens located anywhere in the United States who
had not been admitted or paroled, unless they could prove that they have
been continuously present in the United States for the prior two year
period.265 In September 2019, the District Court for the District of
262. See Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 194, at 833 (noting that ICE has the discretion to
grant release on parole to immigrants with a credible or reasonable fear of persecution are placed into
removal or withholding-only proceedings).
263. See, e.g., R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 174 (D.D.C. 2015). The court in R.I.L-R,
determined that the plaintiff’s claim that “DHS policy directs ICE officers to consider deterrence of
mass migration as a factor in their custody determinations, and that this policy has played a significant
role in the recent increased detention of Central American mothers and children” had merit. Id. Though
the plaintiffs did not make an Equal Protection challenge in R.I.L-R, it remains true that absent a
legitimate national security threat, there is at least an implication that the policy decision was
improperly influenced or motivated by race. Reinforcing racial disparities and oppression may or may
not be inherently a part of enforcing borders and honoring sovereignty.
264. ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN, MOTOMURA, FULLERTON, STUMPF & GULASEKARAM, supra note
242.
265. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409, 35,410 (July 23, 2019);
see Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,880; see also Eagly, Shafer &
Whalley, supra note 194. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order directing
DHS to expand the use of expedited removal to include those arrested anywhere within the United
States within two years of entry. Exec. Order 13,767, 3 C.F.R. § 263 (2018) (“Pursuant to section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the INA, the Secretary shall take appropriate action to apply, in his sole and
unreviewable discretion, the provisions of section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the INA to the aliens
designated under section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).”). On February 20, 2017, DHS Secretary John Kelly
issued preliminary guidance on implementing the President’s Executive Order. Memorandum from
John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs
& Border Prot., on Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvement Policies to Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Lori
Scialabba, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Joseph B. Maher, Acting Gen. Couns.,
Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Int’l Affs., & Chip Fulghum, Acting Undersecretary for
Mgmt. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_
Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JSA5-9AFH] (directing DHS to expand the category of individuals subject to
expedited removal and directing both the CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement to
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Columbia enjoined the expansion because of violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act.266 By June 2020, the D.C. Circuit reversed
the district court and permitted the expansion determining that it was
within the DHS Secretary’s unreviewable discretion.267
Access to an immigration judge is radically curtailed pursuant to the
expedited removal statute. A noncitizen in immigration prison can only
secure an immigration court hearing if they (1) express a fear of returning
to their country; and (2) an asylum officer, or a CBP officer determines
that the noncitizen has a credible fear.268 CBP agents are law enforcement
agents, not neutral arbiters. Unlike asylum officers, CBP agents do not
work within an agency intended to offer humanitarian protection nor are
they trained to provide such protection. If an agent determines that the
noncitizen has a credible fear, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has the discretion to grant the noncitizen’s release on parole;
however, as in recent years, the noncitizen is summarily detained without
a hearing or a formal adjudicatory process.269 Empowering CBP officers
instead of impartial adjudicators raises due process concerns and is one
piece of the puzzle in assessing discriminatory intent.270
Expedited removal and detention practices have received extensive
criticism for undermining due process and access to humanitarian

“conform the use of expedited removal procedures to the designations made in this notice”); Practice
Alert: Implementation of Expedited Removal Expansion, AILA (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.aila.org/
advo-media/aila-practice-pointers-and-alerts/trump-administration-expands-expedited-removal
[https://perma.cc/MYN3-Y5B2] (“[A]ny noncitizen apprehended anywhere within the United States
who is inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(C) or (7), has not been admitted or paroled at a port of
entry, and who cannot prove that he or she has been present in the United States for 2 years or more.”).
Note that the lack of Notice and Comment rulemaking and other Administrative Procedures Act
challenges, however, may be factors the Court could consider in determining whether the expansion,
and the nature of the expansion signified the kind of unusual history indicative of discriminatory intent.
266. Make the Road N.Y. v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 72 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d sub nom.
Make the Road N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc denied, Sept. 22, 2020.
267. Wolf, 962 F.3d at 631–35 (finding that it did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking).
268. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 194, at 808 n.111.
269. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(providing for temporary parole of migrants applying for admission to the United States “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b)(1), 235.3(b)(2)
(2018) (allowing for parole of individuals “who have serious medical conditions in which continued
detention would not be appropriate” and “who have been medically certified as pregnant”); Eagly,
Shafer & Whalley, supra note 194.
270. See, e.g., Ava C. Benach, The Border: How We Got Here, 34 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2019,
at 27, 29 (explaining “metering,” the process CBP used to refuse to process asylum seekers); see also
Daniela Ruiz Ferreyra, Stolen Childhoods: A Chance at Survival Through Asylum in the United States,
16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1029, 1047 (2018) (discussing the role of bias in CBP adjudication
limiting access to asylum).
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protections but demonstrating a violation of the equal protection doctrine
is more challenging.271
3. Does Punitiveness Signify “Unusualness” of a Civil Immigration
Statute Expressly Intended to Deter and Not Punish?
INA § 235 could be characterized as unusual, or a departure from
immigration legislative norms, because the statute created an expedited
removal system and made detention at the border a means of deterrence.
Yet at the same time, it was entirely usual, or historically consistent with
the increasing punitiveness of immigration enforcement.272 Whether
characterized as usual or unusual, Section 235 fits within the Arlington
framework for assessing discriminatory intent.
In response to a 2015 challenge to immigration detention as a
deterrent, the government argued that “one particular individual may be
civilly detained for the sake of sending a message” to others “who may be
considering immigration.”273 The court recognized however, that “the
potential migrants to whom the federal government has sought to send
such a message are,” not just any migrants, but “by and large, [those] from
Mexico and Central America.”274 The court’s observation reads as if it was
considering a discriminatory impact equal protection claim. This
reflection evinces an enforcement history where deterrence has more
heavily burdened Latinx migrants—but has historically not worked to
deter migration.275 Moreover, immigration detention’s failure to deter
migration suggests that it serves another policy goal, even if implicitly—
to punish.276 Professor Emily Ryo suggests that in immigration law,
criminal law, and other areas of law,
271. Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit, supra note 23, at 121 (“Expedited
removal is one critical legal mechanism facilitating the rise in immigration incarceration of asylum
seekers in particular. Expedited removal allows a [DHS] official to summarily remove a noncitizen,
without a hearing before an immigration judge, and precludes appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). Alternatively, expedited removal authorizes detention where a noncitizen expresses a
credible fear of harm.” (internal citations omitted)).
272. García Hernández, supra note 23; García Hernández, supra note 236.
273. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2015).
274. Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 237 (2019).
275. Id. (first citing Adam Cox & Ryan Goodman, Detention of Migrant Families as
“Deterrence”: Ethical Flaws and Empirical Doubts, JUST SEC. (June 22, 2018), https://www.just
security.org/58354/detention-migrant-families-deterrence-ethical-flaws-empirical-doubts/
[https://perma.cc/X9SF-LMLB]; and then citing Tom K. Wong, Do Family Separation
and Detention Deter Immigration?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 24, 2018), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/07/24/453660/family-separation-detention-deterimmigration/ [https://perma.cc/L6YJ-DTDS]).
276. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); see also
MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX 89
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[G]overnment officials often assume, without sound theoretical or
empirical basis, that legal or policy changes can change behavior. Yet
criminal deterrence literature suggests that people generally do not
know the law[;] are bad at rational decision-making[;], and even if
they can make rational decisions, will choose to commit the crime
because the perceived benefits often outweigh the perceived costs.277

Given the failure of deterrence immigration imprisonment may serve
an entirely different societal purpose as a smokescreen for punitiveness. If
that were the case, or even if policymakers employ deterrence lacking a
punitive intent, in spite of evidence that it does not work, use of a policy
that never achieves its goal is evidence of an ulterior purpose.278
If INA § 235 (1) was deemed to fit within the broader setting of the
1996 immigration law reforms; (2) was a natural outgrowth of the
criminalization of immigrants; and (3) had followed all formal procedures
with respect to the legislative process, the statute would be exceptional in
its ordinariness. Put differently, when discriminatory intent manifests in
colorblind state action, and is ordinary and usual, equal protection is
handicapped. Discriminatory impact becomes ordinary and usual, and a
legitimate governmental purpose is always available because proving a
negative is impossible.
Perhaps “usual” rather than “unusual” history of the challenged law
or policy is a relevant benchmark for assessing discriminatory purpose or
intent. What the Arlington Court meant by unusual underscores the
inutility of the test. At times, the Court has narrowly emphasized unusual
history behind the government action, instead of broadly viewing the
“historical background” of the challenged act.279 Immigration
imprisonment in particular—as opposed to DACA rescission, TPS
rescission, or other policies challenged as discriminatory—is similar to the
use of prisons in the criminal justice system in regard to the role it plays

(2002); MICHAEL WELCH, SCAPEGOATS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH: HATE CRIMES & STATE CRIMES IN THE
WAR ON TERROR 90 (Raymond J. Michalowski ed., 2006).
277. Ryo, supra note 274, at 250.
278. I raised this issue in the context of a critical race critique of the Jennings decision where I
suggested that
Mexican and other racialized immigrants of color have also been subject to “selective
enforcement.” Such selective enforcement encompasses policies like the public charge bar,
preventing the immigration of an otherwise qualified applicant, based on financial factors.
Similarly, Mexican nationals who entered the United States unlawfully from Mexico and
were permitted to work, then some were later deported. Racialized immigrants of color
who had been given temporary permission to stay, many who have lived in the United
States for decades, are soon to lose their status as a result of Trump [A]dministration policy
changes.
Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit, supra note 23, at 146.
279. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
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in society. Therefore, the usual historical background concerning the role
of race is uniquely relevant to the Equal Protection analysis.
Pursuant to the Arlington factors, a court could find that INA § 235
results in discriminatory impact with respect to immigration detention at
the border. Particularly, a court could analyze the record expansively to
consider the history of policing the southern border, the role of “darkside
discretion,” the relationship between criminal and immigration
imprisonment, and the failure of deterrence and resulting punitiveness.
However, the Arlington factors can be interpreted narrowly, and the
government can rebut the presumption of discrimination with a
nondiscriminatory purpose. Policing borders is a nondiscriminatory
purpose that is always readily available. Accordingly, a doctrinal shift
toward an effects-based method of invalidation would increase the equal
protection effectiveness in immigration law.
IV. DOCTRINAL SHIFT TOWARD PROTECTION
This Article adds to the literature critiquing the intent doctrine
finding it largely counterproductive to anti-discrimination and anti-racism
goals.280 While the Arlington factors could be interpreted and applied in a
manner more likely to invalidate discriminatory government action, there
are better solutions. The hypothetical crimmigration law scenario explored
here highlights the problems with the doctrine.281 This final section
provides additional examples of how Arlington could be more effective,
and turns to alternatives that would better reflect Arlington’s progressive,
racial justice impetuses.282
Immigration law has been deemed exceptional because of its
departure from constitutional norms283 and its racializing effects. The
Arlington analysis, combined with plenary power, fails to remedy the
longstanding implicit bias fostered by immigration law. An equal
280. See Eyer, supra note 47, at 74; Siegel, supra note 41; Strauss, supra note 40; Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (discussing the doctrine’s dissonance
between black letter law declaring discrimination unlawful and continued non-violative
discrimination); see also Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits
of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012) (discussing evidence suggesting that most
people perceive discrimination explicit and intentional); Selmi, supra note 40.
281. For more on this apparent constitutional drift, see Eyer, supra note 47, at 7 (first citing
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 130–32 (1999); then citing
Jack M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993); and
then comparing David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249 (2013)).
282. Eyer, supra note 47, at 4 (explaining that for most of intent doctrine’s history, it was a
progressive project, believed to serve racial justice aims).
283. See generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (describing immigration law as exceptional with
respect to constitutionality and rights).
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protection challenge to INA § 235 would have more potential if the Court
looked to the pre-1970s equal protection intent jurisprudence.284 For
example, the Court could embrace a more expansive view of historical
discrimination evidence, particularly in light of the role of race in
immigration law. Justice Sotomayor has already endorsed such an
approach in Trump v. Hawaii and Regents.285 Additionally, either the
“intent-based” or “effects-based” iteration of the method of assessing
disparate impact cases would better curtail systemic bias in immigration
law.
Equal protection is particularly limited in regard to identifying
discrimination in a reenacted or amended statute where the original statute
evidences clear discriminatory motivation but the new statute does not. In
such scenarios, where disparate impact is proven, the Court could require
more than an absence of discriminatory intent in the record to find that the
taint of discrimination was purged from the earlier statute.286 This would
be a step toward the effects-based invalidation model and could be used
within the Arlington framework. However, pursuant to Arlington, the
government could still avoid invalidation of the law if it could prove a
nondiscriminatory justification.
Alternatively, the Court could go a step further and eliminate the
intent doctrine and replace it with the prior effects-based invalidation
model. Effects-based invalidation did not have an express intent
requirement; it instead focused on the “stigmatizing” or
“subordinating effects” of state action as constitutive of discrimination.287
Similarly, pre-Washington v. Davis intent-based invalidation was a
“more permissive basis for invalidating invidiously intended” but race-

284. While there was an era of pre-Arlington jurisprudence that was more effective, particularly
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), when the Court responded to the South’s persistent
refusal to integrate schools, even that case did not mark a radical shift away from what has been called
“effects-focused” intent and relevant jurisprudence. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 47, at 12 (“[I]n
sweeping away the separate-but-equal doctrine, the Court did not wipe the slate of Equal Protection
doctrine clean.”)
285. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1918 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part).
286. A district court recently did exactly that, validating an equal protection challenge to 8 USC
1326, a criminal, illegal reentry statute. See United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d 996 (D.
Nev. 2021).
287. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1155–56 (1991); Eyer, supra note 47, at 10
(“look[ing] to numbers or effects as the primary metric of a constitutional violation”); see also Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (holding that “the actual effect of the enactments” and not the
motive was the relevant question for a disparate impact equal protection challenge).
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neutral state action.288 In the 1886 alienage law invalidated in Yick Wo, a
Chinese national lawfully residing in the United States challenged a
regulation on business licensing that disparately impacted ethnically
Chinese-owned laundries.289 The Yick Wo Court’s invalidation of the
regulation emphasized the arbitrary exercise of discretion. The Court
further recognized it as sufficient evidence of infringement upon equal
protection rights.290 The question of discretionary authority is relevant to
the hypothetical INA § 235 challenge. Following the Yick Wo intent-based
invalidation model, a court could consider disparate impact plus the
government’s exercise of darkside discretion in uniformly exercising
discretion to detain all Central American and Mexican migrants seeking
admission at the southern border.
Another intent-based invalidation case, Griffin v. County School
Board, effectively recognized implicit intent.291 Prince Edward County, in
Virginia, closed public schools in an effort to avoid integration.292 The
Court found an equal protection violation because the government stopped
funding integrated schools.293 The difference between the Griffin iteration
of the intent doctrine and what came after it was the Court’s willingness
to recognize broader historical and contextual clues indicative of systemic
bias. The Court asserted that the measures taken were done to avoid school
integration and that any “nonracial” justification was irrelevant and
impliedly disingenuous.294
However, intent-based invalidation does not address the problem of
“intentional blindness.”295 The problem Griffin sought to cure, following
288. Eyer, supra note 47; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); Palmer,
403 U.S. at 225.
289. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (finding the ordinance “divides the
owners or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their personal character and qualifications
for the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely
by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue their industry by the
mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld,
at their mere will and pleasure”); see also Eyer, supra note 47, at 74 (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 588, 596 (1935)).
290. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373.
291. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964); see Eyer, supra note 47, at 74
(citing Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231–32); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) (using
what may have been an intent-based approach).
292. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231–32.
293. Id. at 221.
294. Id. at 231–32 (“Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State’s allowing a county to
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition
to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional. . . . [I]t is plain that both were created to accomplish
the same thing: the perpetuation of racial segregation.”).
295. Haney-López, supra note 49; Eyer, supra note 47, at 31 (explaining that the Court [in
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)] would later contort that ruling to suggest that Griffin was
concerned with the “actual effect[s]” of the government’s action, “not upon the motivation which led
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Brown v. Board of Education, still exists as schools suffer from de facto
segregation. The Court has implicitly sanctioned this de facto segregation,
particularly in the post-Davis era.296 Although it remains true that even if
the “discriminatory purpose standard” seems appropriate if the question is
“whether a decision was made ‘because of’ race,” it is still “a poor vehicle
for identifying instances of such decisions”297 because of unconscious
racism and systemic bias.298 Equally as important, the intent test needlessly
focuses on the perpetrator’s perspective rather than the victim’s
experience.299
Deployment of discretion to detain at the southern border lacks a
national security rationale or good faith, and fails to achieve the legislative
goal of deterring migration.300 In considering an alternative approach to
discerning intent that could similarly address this problem, scholar Angela
Onwuachi-Willig undertook an exploration of the shift in intent that
occurred pursuant to Washington v. Davis. Onwuachi-Willig hypothesized
about what the outcome might have been if the intent analysis followed
the Loving v. Virginia decision striking down interracial marriage.301
Onwuachi-Willig suggested that the Davis Court could have explored two
questions: (1) “[W]hether the government’s actions made sense in light of
its stated purpose,” which suggests what the Court may have determined
the States to behave as they did,” such that “the Palmer majority thus refused to allow intent-based
invalidation despite undisputed evidence of segregationist intent”).
296. See James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Two Shades of Brown: The Failure of Desegregation in
America; Why It Is Irremediable (and A Modest Proposal), 24 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
271, 272 (2018) (arguing that since Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
Supreme Court’s decisions made the current segregated state of our public schools almost inevitable);
Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, Riding the Plessy Train: Reviving Brown for A New Civil
Rights Era for Micro-Desegregation, 36 CHICANX LATINX L. REV. 1, 2 (2019) (“Decades after the
United States Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision, America’s public schools
remain segregated.”); Justin Driver, The Keyes of Constitutional Law, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1931, 1933–
34 (2018) (“Keyes [v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973)] acknowledged that unconstitutionally
segregated schools existed outside of the South, the Court nevertheless imputed liability to nonsouthern jurisdictions only by identifying intentionally discriminatory acts-a technique that made it
unduly difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to prevail on desegregation suits.” (italics and emphasis
added)). Katie Eyer, however, explains that “de facto” segregation is a term of more nuanced meaning:
it “was the term used in the 1970s to describe segregation that was not caused by intentional
segregationist state action (intentionally or facially segregationist state action was referred to as “de
jure” segregation).” Eyer, supra note 47, at 74 n.131 (parenthetical in original) (emphasis added)
(citing John W. Hanley, Jr., Case Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern
Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 124, 124 & n.5 (1974)).
297. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 287, at 1161 (citing Strauss, supra note 40, at 956).
298. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 229.
299. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 287, at 1161 (citing Freeman, supra note 280).
300. See Emily Ryo, The Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Enforcement Policies,
118 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. e2103000118 (2021).
301. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Loving v. Virginia to Washington v. Davis: The Erosion
of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Intent Analysis, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 309 (2018).
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if it “had looked underneath” the relevant government action to ask
whether it “made sense” with respect to the relevant purpose;302 or (2)
whether the outcome may have been different if “the Court had more
closely evaluated the [D.C. Metropolitan Police] Department’s actions to
assess whether its” actions “had been in good faith.” 303 If such an
evaluation was employed to consider whether INA § 235 violated equal
protection, the Court could ask, (1) whether immigration prisons made
sense in deterring migration; and (2) whether the imprisonment to deter
migration was in good faith. Before even considering any humanitarian
concerns, the Court could determine that if immigration prisons do not
prevent migration, then they do not achieve the intended aim.
While the equal protection intent history demonstrates a possibility
of achieving greater protectiveness, the persistent role of race in all facets
of social, political, and economic life too often evades redress. If equal
protection embodies a commitment to end “subordination, stigma,” and
“second-class citizenship,” including for noncitizens at the border or in
immigration jails, the Court should eliminate this subordination304 and
stigma305 in its jurisprudence. A disparate impact test that does not analyze
intent, but instead analyzes the foreseeability of disparate impact, or
disparate impact in addition to the history of past discrimination, could be
a meaningful and reasonable doctrinal shift.306
The current political moment and the question of an equal protection
remedy for those in border immigration jails can be understood through
the lens of the late critical race theorist Derrick Bell’s concept of interest
convergence. To explain and contextualize Brown v. Board of Education,
Bell stated that the interest of people who identify as Black and those who
are considered white had momentarily converged to bring about the
judicial outcome.307 Bell argued that self-interest motivated white people
to end segregation.308 Desegregation was motivated by concerns about the
international perception of the United States resulting from poor treatment
of Black Americans who fought in World War II, but came home to
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Diana R. Donahoe, Not-So-Great Expectations: Implicit Racial Bias in the
Supreme Court’s Consent to Search Doctrine, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619, 621 (2018) (discussing the
Court’s institutionalization of racial subordination through equal protection jurisprudence).
305. Strauss, supra note 40, at 941–46.
306. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 287, at 1162 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 154–55 (1976)); see also Paul Brest, Foreword: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–36 (1976).
307. Bell, Jr., supra note 38, at 523 (“‘[I]nterest convergence’ provides: The interest of [B]lack
[people] in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests
of white[ people].”).
308. Id. at 524–26.
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segregation and racism. Segregation was also a barrier to industrialization
and economic development.309
Interest convergence theory helps explain the Court’s decision in
cases other than Brown. Professor Richard Delgado applied interestconvergence theory to explain an outcome in a case concerning exclusion
of Mexican-Americans from juries.310 He contended that the theory was
applicable narrowly to Mexican-American jurists and more broadly
applicable to Latinx history in the United States.311 Similarly, the Court,
in Plyler v. Doe312 recognized an undocumented child’s right to an
education as an equal protection win indicative of interest convergence.313
The nation’s interest to support an educated populace merged with Latinx
immigrants and minority students. Today, in the face of a rise in white
supremacist terrorism, the Court should examine the meaning and
significance of membership in the community.314 It may be particularly
important to recognize the rifts caused by implicitly biased government
action in order to repel ever encroaching white supremacy and xenophobic
nationalism.315 The treatment of those at our border has symbolic and real
significance in how the United States is perceived and the power it can
wield.
The current political moment is more like the Cold War period, or
the period in which Plyler was adjudicated than may be evident at first
blush. The need to shore up our democracy both from within and for the
purposes of public perception is even more important now than it was
then.316 For instance, the Trump Administration “torpedoed” the United

309. Id. at 535.
310. Delgado, supra note 210.
311. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 63 (2006) (applying interest-convergence to
explain the Court’s decision prohibiting the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from juries and
contending that interest-convergence is a helpful method for understanding “all of Latino history”).
312. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
313. María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children:
Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005). López notes that unless
undocumented students have a path to legal status, their education is of limited value to their
participation in and contribution to the country. Id. López complicates the question of interest
convergence by suggesting that Plyler demonstrates “the nation’s interest [in] the maintenance of an
underclass of undocumented, low-wage earners who fuel the nation’s economy.” Id.
314. See Ursula Moffitt, White Supremacists Who Stormed the US Capitol Are Only the Most
Visible Product of Racism, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 15, 2021), https://theconversation.com/whitesupremacists-who-stormed-us-capitol-are-only-the-most-visible-product-of-racism-152295
[https://perma.cc/T2BA-UGDW].
315. Natsu Taylor Saito, Why Xenophobia?, BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. (forthcoming 2021).
316. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and
the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33–34, 224 (2020) (describing the recent degradation of the American
democracy, attributed in part, to Trump’s racism—“autocrats frequently vilify minority racial and
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States’ standing and moral authority in the international community. 317
Now, President Biden recognizes the challenge of defending our
democracy and democratic values of equality and justice, and that by
doing so, we define ourselves in opposition to China and Russia.318 In the
words of President Biden:
[W]e must start with diplomacy rooted in America’s most cherished
democratic values: defending freedom, . . . upholding universal
rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with
dignity. That’s the grounding wire of our . . . global power.319

Treatment of immigrants and the recognition of asylum law as a
question of racial justice is intrinsically bound in the pursuit of democratic
values—respecting the rule of law, dignity, and universal rights. Thus, we
are again at a moment where the interest of white people aligns with those
in need of equal protection. A more robust equal protection remedy to
address disparate impact in southern border immigration jails would
bolster the nation’s stature as a global leader, with no adverse
consequences.320 The American democratic project would benefit from
lower- and middle-class white people recognizing the commonality of
shared struggle with historically oppressed minorities.321 The

religious groups to unify supporters and divert attention from their own failures” and warning that the
Supreme Court failed to protect democracy).
317. Ryan Bort, America Last: How Trump Torpedoed the U.S. International Standing, ROLLING
STONE (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/trump-foreign-policydestroyed-international-standing-1084802/ [https://perma.cc/FE2M-UEBW]; see also Eliot A. Cohen,
How Trump is Ending the American Era, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/is-trump-ending-the-american-era/537888/ [https://perma.cc/
PU68-Q4ZG] (“Trump has abdicated leadership and the moral high ground.”); Alissa J. Rubin,
Allies Fear Trump is Eroding America’s Moral Authority, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/europe/in-trumps-america-a-toned-down-voice-forhuman-rights.html [https://perma.cc/P2Y8-KU4E].
318. Joseph R. Biden, President of the U.S., Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in
the World (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/
remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/X4ZS-U5RU].
319. Id.
320. Bell, Jr., supra note 38, at 523 (suggesting that “the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, standing
alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for [B]lack[ people]
where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class white[
people]”). But see Melvin J. Kelley IV, Retuning Bell: Searching for Freedom’s Ring as Whiteness
Resurges in Value, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 131, 140 (2018) (reconfiguring and merging
Bell’s interest convergence theory with Professor Cheryl Harris’ concept of Whiteness as property and
suggesting that “more robust judicial remedies” are less likely to advance equality interests but will
create change by “inspire[ing] future social justice movements”).
321. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, MERGE LEFT: FUSING RACE AND CLASS, WINNING
ELECTIONS, AND SAVING AMERICA 194 (2019); see also Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic
Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90, 92 (2020) (“The United States ‘is not a democracy.’ Our
political system is ‘dominate[d]’ by ‘the wealthiest Americans’ and ‘well-funded interest groups,’
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socioeconomic stagnation of the American economy is a threat to national
stability—a problem better addressed through finding common cause and
enhancing equality.322
This discussion shows how enhancing equal protection review in
immigration asylum and detention cases is desirable, feasible, and
necessary not just morally but doctrinally and politically. Ending the
needless cruelty at our border furthers the goal of elevating the United
States and distinguishing it from countries with poor human rights records.
Given the rising tide of civil rights movements and the threat of white
nationalist extremism, ending racially disparate immigration detention
should be an interest in which policymakers and the courts can find merit.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the equal protection intent doctrine inside and
outside of immigration law, plenary power in immigration law, and the
way the two work together. In an effort to understand the systemic failure
of equal protection in remedying and deterring invidious discrimination, it
then examined a hypothetical equal protection challenge to an immigration
statute that resulted in disproportionate imprisonment of migrants from the
Northern Triangle in search of protection.
The equal protection failure directly and proportionately relates to
the persistence of white supremacy and racial caste.323 The continued
failure to meaningfully strive for equality and anti-discrimination norms,
particularly with respect to how our democracy treats immigrants,
undermines the nation’s legitimacy.324 The United States’ response to
Mexican, Central American, and Latinx migration—prisons, precarity,
and exclusion—is fundamental to the equality equation. If equal protection
effectively protected people from discrimination, perhaps immigration
prisons would no longer be necessary.
whereas ‘working-class and middle-class Americans exercise almost no influence on political
outcomes across a wide array of issues.’”) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
322. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An
Intellectual History, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2016) (arguing that “the American middle class has
been hollowed out” and that “growing that economic inequality is leading to political inequality” such
that the “collapse of the middle class” could threaten our constitutional system).
323. Hamilton-Jiang, supra note 6, at 62 & n.169 (“As a result, while the manifestation of racism
may have evolved in the United States, race and racism continue to provide the avenue to maintain
white supremacy and sustained racial caste. The systemic permanency of race alone suggests that race
may be intertwined with the experiences of Latinx unaccompanied children entering the border.”)
(internal citations omitted) (citing DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACE (1992) (declaring “the permanence of racism as an integral and permanent part
of American society.”)).
324. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 664 (2015)
(“Any normatively justifiable deportation system requires equity.”).

